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I. INTRODUCTION
The treatment for federal income tax purposes of economic prizes
and awards has evolved over the more than seventy years since the
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ratification of the sixteenth amendment' and the enactment of the
modern individual income tax in 1913.2 The historical development of
this tax microcosm discloses much about fundamental shifts in Ameri-
can values and policy over time.
Prior to the passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 3 section 74 of
the Internal Revenue Code4 provided an incentive for the individual
taxpayer to expend time and energy in the pursuit of objectives that
would benefit society as a whole. The range of humanitarian or public
activities so encouraged included religious, charitable, scientific, edu-
cational, artistic, literary, and civic achievement. If the winner had
not solicited the prize and had no obligation to render future services,
a tax benefit, in the form of an exclusion of the value of the award
from gross income, was available.
The stimulation of altruistic endeavors, which was thought to be
suitable and appropriate tax policy for decades,' is apparently no
longer central to current American values, at least as articulated by
Congress in the Tax Reform Act of 1986.6 Tax policy now encourages
productivity, economic efficiency, and competitiveness in the world
marketplace.7 It is without doubt that promotion of the nation's eco-
nomic welfare is a legitimate public goal and that changing economic
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI ("The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on
incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and
without regard to any census or enumeration.").
2. Tariff Act of 1913, Pub. L. No. 16, § 2, 38 Stat. 114 (1913) [hereinafter 1913 Act].
3. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986) [hereinafter TRA86].
4. I.R.C. § 74 (1982) (amended 1986). Prior to the TRA86, this section provided:
(a) General Rule.-Except as provided in subsection (b) and in section 117 (relating to
scholarships and fellowship grants), gross income includes amounts received as prizes and
awards.
(b) Exception.-Gross income does not include amounts received as prizes and awards
made primarily in recognition of religious, charitable, scientific, educational, artistic,
literary, or civic achievement, but only if-
(1) the recipient was selected without any action on his part to enter the contest or
proceeding; and
(2) the recipient is not required to render substantial future services as a condition to
receiving the prize or award.
5. See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 178-79, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 4621, 4813 [hereinafter 1954 S. REP.].
6. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 99TH CONG., 2D SESS., GENERAL EXPLANATION
OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, at 31-32 (Comm. Print 1987) [hereinafter GENERAL
EXPLANATION OF TRA86].
7. See GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TRA 86, supra note 6, at 6-11; 1 TREASURY DEPT.
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY, AND ECONOMIC
GROWTH 13-20 (1984), reprinted in [Bulletin 51, sec. 4] 59,475 (Nov. 29, 1984) [hereinafter I
TREASURY REPORT]; THE PRESIDENT's TAX PROPOSALS TO THE CONGRESS FOR FAIRNESS,
GROWTH AND SIMPLICITY (Summary) 5-7 (May 29, 1985) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S
PROPOSALS].
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conditions will necessitate changes in the tax law.' Nonetheless,
noneconomic public needs and values are also worthy of promotion.9
This article evaluates whether the recent emasculation of the exclu-
sion for bona fide public achievement prizes or awards was justified.
In order to accomplish the task, the article will begin by setting forth
the applicable statutory provisions and tracing their historical devel-
opment. Second, the policy implications of new section 74(b) will be
analyzed in depth. Next, the article will offer an alternative that
would effectively deal with the problem of compensatory employer to
employee awards, while retaining the long standing policy of using tax
incentives to encourage humanitarian or public contribution. The
article concludes by arguing that Congress' shift to a tax policy that
measures the welfare of society by economic productivity and not with
reference to humanitarian and public values, such as charity, religion,
science, education or cultural achievement, is short-sighted and
mistaken.
II. EVOLUTION OF THE STATUTORY PATTERN
A. The Early Years (1913-1954)
The early federal income tax laws contained no separate provision
governing the taxation of prizes and awards. Then as now, the term
"income" was broadly defined.1° The 1913 definition of "net income"
included
gains, profits, and income derived from salaries, wages, or compensation
for personal service of whatever kind and in whatever form paid, or
from professions, vocations, businesses, trade, commerce, or sales, or
dealings in property, whether real or personal, growing out of the own-
ership or use of or interest in real or personal property, also from inter-
est, rent, dividends, securities, or the transaction of any lawful business
8. One clear example of the perceived need to modify the tax structure to stimulate the
economy is the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat.- 172 (1981)
[hereinafter ERTA]. The poor state of the national economy during the latter years of the Carter
Administration was a key issue in the 1980 presidential election. Tax cuts to stimulate the
economy were a key plank in Ronald Reagan's campaign platform. -Following the election,
Congress enacted ERTA for the purpose of encouraging productivity and real economic growth.
See generally STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 97TH CONG., IST SEss., GENERAL
EXPLANATION OF THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY TAX ACT OF 1981 (Comm. Print 1981).
9. See Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy: A Comparison
with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REV. 705 (1970) (considering whether tax
incentives are as useful or efficient an implement of social policy as direct government grants,
loans, or subsidy programs).
10. I.R.C. § 61 (1987) contains the present definition of gross income. The broad scope of the
section is illustrated by the examples set forth therein.
259
Washington Law Review Vol. 63:257, 1988
carried on for gain or profit, or gains or profits and income derived from
any source whatever .... 1
With minor modification 12 the broadly inclusive concept of income
remained throughout numerous reenactments13 of the statute up to
and including the Internal Revenue Code of 1939."4
A taxpayer seeking to exclude an item of positive economic value
received during the taxable year had to establish the existence of statu-
tory authority for the exemption or exclusion.' 5 At the outset of the
federal income tax in 1913, there were very few exemptions or exclu-
sions. The only sources of income which were specifically excluded or
exempted from tax were interest on governmental obligations, 16 sala-
ries of state and local employees, 17 compensation paid to the President
of the United States and federal judges,1 8 the proceeds of life insurance
11. 1913 Act, supra note 2, § II(B), at 167.
12. See, e.g., Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 254, § 213, 40 Stat. 1057, 1065 (1919)
(changing the defined term to "gross income").
13. See, e.g., Revenue Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 176, § 213, 43 Stat. 253, 267 (1924); Revenue
Act of 1928, Pub. L. No. 562, § 22, 45 Stat. 791, 797 (1928).
14. See Internal Revenue Code of 1939, Pub. L. No. 1, § 22(a), 53 Stat. 1 (1939) [hereinafter
1939 Code].
15. The broadly inclusive definition of income set forth in the 1913 Act was prefaced by an
exceptive clause: "That, subject only to such exemptions and deductions as are hereafter allowed,
the net income of a taxable person shall include . 1913 Act, supra note 2, § II(B), at 167
(emphasis added).
16. The 1913 Act provided: "That in computing net income under this section there shall be
excluded the interest upon the obligations of a state or any political subdivision thereof, and upon
the obligations of the United States or its possessions .... 1913 Act, supra note 2, § II(B), at
168. The general exclusion from gross income of interest on federal obligations lasted only until
1917. However, the exclusion for interest on state or local obligations has continued to the
present (albeit with considerable restrictions added by recent tax acts including TRA86). See
I.R.C. §§ 103, 141-150 (1987). For a general discussion on the doctrine of intergovernmental
tax immunities, see 1 B. BITTKER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTs
1.2.8 (1981).
17. The 1913 Act also excluded from gross income "the compensation of all officers and
employees of a State or any political subdivision thereof except when such compensation is paid
by the United States Government." 1913 Act, supra note 2, § II(B), at 168. This exclusion was
repealed by section 213 of the Revenue Act of 1918 which expanded the scope of gross income to
specifically include salaries, wages, or compensation of "all other officers and employees, whether
elected or appointed, of the United States, Alaska, Hawaii, or any political subdivision thereof, or
the District of Columbia .... Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. Law No. 254, § 213, 40 Stat. 1057,
1065 (1919).
18. The concern about taxing the salaries of the President and federal judges related back to
constitutional provisions prohibiting the diminution of their compensation during their
continuance in office. See U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 1, cl. 6; see also id. art. III, § 1. The Revenue
Act of 1918 deleted the exclusion by expanding the definition of gross income to include the
compensation of "the President of the United States [and] the judges of the Supreme and inferior
courts of the United States." Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. Law No. 254, § 213.40 Stat. 1057, 1065
(1919). This amendment was not, however, given retroactive effect so that federal judges
appointed before 1918 continued to enjoy the exemptions. See, e.g., O'Malley v. Woodrough,
260
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policies paid upon the death of the insured19 and the value of property
acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or descent."0 The gift and inheri-
tance exclusion did not, however, extend to the income from the gra-
tuitously transferred property.2'
Certain of the original 1913 exclusions have since been repealed2 2
and others have been added,23 but the exclusion from gross income of
the value of property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or inheritance
has continued to the present.2 4 A number of critics over the years
have questioned the wisdom of this exclusion25 which is now set forth
in Code section 102.26 The reason initially offered for the exclusion
from income tax of gifts and bequests was Congress' intention to tax
307 U.S. 277 (1939); Baker v. Commissioner, 149 F.2d 342 (4th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S.
746 (1945).
19. The 1913 Act provided an exemption from gross income for amounts paid on life
insurance policies either as death proceeds to a beneficiary or as the cash value to the insured
upon maturity or surrender of the policy:
Provided, That the proceeds of life insurance policies paid upon the death of the person
insured or payments made by or credited to the insured, on life insurance, endowment, or
annuity contracts, upon the return thereof to the insured at the maturity of the term
mentioned in the contract, or upon surrender of contract, shall not be included as income.
1913 Act, supra note 2, § II(B), at 167. The policy underlying the exclusion of death proceeds is
partly one of compassion and partly one of allowing a tax-free recovery of the amounts invested
in the policy by the owner during the life of the insured. The fact that the above language might
allow the policy owner to recover tax-free not just his investment in the contract but also the
earnings thereon, even though the insured was still alive, led Congress to amend this exemption
in the Revenue Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 271, 39 Stat. 756 (1916). Section 4 of the 1916 Act
provides:
The following income shall be exempt from the provisions of this title: The proceeds of life
insurance policies paid to individual beneficiaries upon the death of the insured; the amount
received by the insured, as a return of premium or premiums paid by him under life insur-
ance, endowment, or annuity contracts, either during the term or at the maturity of the term
mentioned in the contract or upon surrender of the contract....
Id. § 4, at 758
20. The definition of net income in section II(B) of the 1913 Act included "the income from
but not the value of property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or descent." 1913 Act, supra note
2, § II(B), at 167.
21. Id.
22. See, eg., supra note 17.
23. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 121 (1987) (one-time exclusion of up to $125,000 of the gain realized on
the sale of principal residence by taxpayer age 55 or older).
24. I.R.C. § 102(a) (1987) provides: "Gross income does not include the value of property
acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or inheritance."
25. See, e.g., H. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION: THE DEFINITION OF INCOME AS A
PROBLEM OF FISCAL POLICY 56-58, 125-47 (1938); COMM'N TO REVISE THE TAX STRUCTURE,
REFORMING THE FEDERAL TAX STRUCTURE 18 (1973); Andres, The Accessions Tax Proposal
22 TAX L. REV. 589 (1967); McNulty, Fundamental Alternatives to Present Transfer Tax
Systems, in DEATH, TAXES AND FAMILY PROPERTY 85, 89-93 (E. Halbach, Jr. ed. 1977).
26. See supra note 24.
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inter vivos and testamentary wealth transfers separately. 27 The subse-
quent enactment of the federal estate28 and gift taxes29 carried this
intention to fruition.
During the early period, when there was no specific statutory provi-
sion dealing with prizes and awards, one might have assumed (consis-
tent with the comprehensive scope of the income concept) that the
receipt of any valuable prize or award would be taxed as "income
derived from any source whatever."3 ° In general, that assumption
would have been correct. A wide variety of contest awards and sweep-
stakes, lottery, and door prizes were held to be taxable. 3' There were,
however, a number of instances where different prizes and awards
were held to be gifts and, therefore, excluded from gross income.32
The determination of whether a particular prize or award constituted
a constructive gift and was therefore exempt from taxation was made
on a case by case basis.3 3 This ad hoc treatment of the prize and award
cases gave rise to inconsistent results.34
27. See J. WITTE, THE POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 78
(1985); 1 B. BITTKER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS 10.1 (1981).
28. Title II of the Revenue Act of 1916 introduced the federal estate tax which is now found
at I.R.C. §§ 2001-2210 (1987).
29. The federal gift tax, which is presently set forth at I.R.C. §§ 2501-2524 (1987), can be
traced back to Title III of the Revenue Act of 1932, Pub. L. No. 154, 47 Stat. 169 (1932). An
earlier version of the gift tax was introduced in Part II of Title III of the Revenue Act of 1924,
Pub. L. No. 176, 43 Stat. 253 (1924). This abortive attempt was repealed by section 1200(a) of
the Revenue Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 20, 44 Stat. 9 (1926).
30. 1913 Act, supra note 2, § II(B), at 167.
31. See, e.g., Silver v. Commissioner, 42 B.T.A. 461, 463-64 (1940) (Irish Sweepstakes
winnings held taxable); Riebe v. Commissioner, 41 B.T.A. 935 (1940) (lottery prize held taxable),
aff'd 124 F.2d 399 (6th Cir. 1941); I.T. 1667, 2-1 C.B. 54 (1923) (lottery prize selected from meal
checks of restaurant customers was taxable income to winner); I.T. 1655, 2-1 C.B. 54 (1923)
(lottery prize given in newspaper advertising promotion taxable to recipient).
32. See, e.g., Wilkie v. Commissioner, 127 F.2d 953 (6th Cir.) (certain science and public
service prizes found to be gifts and therefore not taxable), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 659 (1942).
33. An informative discussion of the early decisions may be found in Note, Fellowships and
Scholarships, Prizes and Avards-Ante 1954, Post 1954, 7 SYRACUSE L. REV. 130, 135 (1955).
34. The results were particularly inconsistent with regard to automobiles given away as door
prizes at events ranging from baseball games to home shows. Prizes were held taxable in:
Bonacker v. United States, 202 F. Supp. 14 (W.D.N.Y. 1961) (winner had purchased a $20 ticket
for a convention dinner at which the car was given as a door prize); Downes v. Commissioner, 30
T.C. 396 (1958) (taxpayer's purchase of $5 chance resulted in taxability of automobile won as
prize; fact that charity sponsored lottery was immaterial); Solomon v. Commissioner, 25 T.C.
936 (1956) (taxpayer's charitable motive in buying ticket at charity bazaar held immaterial as to
prizes won); Sykes v. Commissioner, 24 T.C. 1156 (1955) (car won as door prize at a club dinner
held taxable even though the ticket had been purchased for the winner by his host). In contrast.
automobiles won in the following instances were held to be gifts and therefore not taxable: Glenn
v. Bates, 217 F.2d 535 (6th Cir. 1954) (car received by random selection for visiting a dealer's
showroom to see new models treated as a gift since taxpayer did not enter any contest and had
not been required to do anything), aff'g 114 F. Supp. 445 (W.D. Ky. 1953) Lawton v. United
Vol. 63:257, 1988
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The Tax Court in Washburn v. Commissioner35 attempted to set
down some guidelines to determine whether a prize or award qualified
as a gift. During 1941, Mrs. Washburn's telephone number was ran-
domly selected and the radio program Pot O'Gold called and awarded
her $900 for simply answering the phone. The check was delivered
within a half hour by a messenger with a telegram that read: "Here-
with draft for nine hundred dollars outright cash gift with our compli-
ments presented by Tum's Pot O'Gold program. Congratulations from
Tommy Tucker and ourselves. [Signed] Lewis Howe Company, Mak-
ers of Tums." 3
6
The court concluded that the radio show giveaway prize constituted
a nontaxable gift since there was no expectation or effort on the part of
the recipient, no subsequent obligation on her part to perform any
services or to make any commercial endorsement, no wager made by
the recipient, and since the prize transferor had denominated the pay-
ment as an "outright cash gift."'37 This case became known as the "Pot
O'Gold" case. The criteria set forth by the court, including the
donor's subjective intention and the lack of effort or obligation on the
part of the recipient, became standards by which subsequent courts
analyzed the taxability of prizes and awards.38
Using criteria similar to those developed in the "Pot O'Gold" case,
the Tax Court in McDermott v. Commissioner39 found that where a
recipient of an award had entered an American Bar Association con-
test by writing and submitting an essay," the prize given to the winner
States, 144 F. Supp. 638 (E.D. Va. 1956) (automobile won as door prize at home show held not
taxable even though taxpayer knew prizes were to be given away and had deposited his admission
stub in container from which winning selection was made); Fernandez v. Fahs, 144 F. Supp. 630
(S.D. Fla. 1956) (automobile won as door prize at minor league baseball game held to be a
nontaxable gift since winner was a loyal baseball fan and would have gone to game anyway even
without giveaway promotion).
35. Washburn v. Commissioner, 5 T.C. 1333 (1945).
36. Id. at 1334.
37. Id. at 1335.
38. Valuable merchandise and money prizes won in connection with radio quiz shows were
held to be nontaxable gifts in: Campeau v. Commissioner, 24 T.C. 370 (1955) (taxpayer received
telephone call from radio show "Hollywood Calling-Film of Fortune" and correctly answered
two questions thereby winning over $12,000 in cash and merchandise); Zemp v. United States, 51
A.F.T.R. (P-H) 1800 (D. Wyo. 1956) (jury verdict holding cash and merchandise won on radio
quiz program to be gifts rather than compensation for services). But see Turner v. Commissioner,
13 T.C.M. (CCH) 462 (1954) (trip to Buenos Aires won as prize on radio "Name That Tune"
quiz show held taxable; only issue involved determination of fair market value of the first class
steamship tickets); I.T. 3987, 1950-1 C.B. 9 (stating Internal Revenue Service position that
participation in radio quiz show resulted in taxability of prizes won therein).
39. 3 T.C. 929 (1944), rev'd, 150 F.2d 585 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
40. The contest sponsored by the American Bar Association ("ABA")had been funded by a
bequest from Erskine M. Ross who had died in 1928. His will had provided the sum of$100,000
263
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was includable in gross income.4 The Tax Court based its decision on
the facts that the recipient had entered the contest and submitted an
essay to the judges and that the award could have been compensation
for the writing of the essay.42 The case, known as the "Ross Essay"
case, was appealed by the taxpayer. The United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia held that the award was a gift
rather than compensation and therefore not includable in gross
income.a3 The appellate court recognized the guidelines established by
the Tax Court, but did not find the fact that the recipient had entered
the contest determinative on the issue of includability.
Although the winner had to write an essay and submit it to the
American Bar Association, the prize was not found to be compensa-
tion for the writing of the essay, but rather an incentive to all of the
contest entrants to pursue their best endeavors." The purpose of the
contest benefactor was "to 'give' and to 'incite', not to employ or
buy." 45 The analogy between this prize and a gift was noted by the
court in that neither can be counted upon in advance and they may
never recur.4 6 The court also found that while the contest prize might
have directed and more or less increased the writer's effort, this added
motive was more a matter of prestige than of money.4 7
While the gift versus compensation issue ultimately turned upon the
intentions of the contest sponsor and winner, it is worth noting that
the court recognized the existence and validity of tax incentives to
encourage scholarly achievement that will benefit society as a whole:
The Commissioner does not say that taxes have ever been collected on
Nobel prizes, Guggenheim fellowships, Rhodes scholarships, Ross
prizes, or any of the many scholarships and prizes which, like these,
have long been awarded . . . to scientists, scholars, or students. We
think we may infer that the practice has been to the contrary. This
long-continued administrative interpretation of the law is entitled to
to be invested and the income therefrom to be awarded annually as a prize for the best discussion
on a topic to be selected each year by the ABA. Mr. McDermott's winning essay was entitled
"To What Extent Should Decisions of Administrative Tribunals be Reviewable by the Courts?"
Id. at 929.
41. Id. at 932.
42. Id. at 930-31.
43. McDermott v. Commissioner, 150 F.2d 585 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
44. Id. at 587-88.
45. Id. at 588.
46. The court noted: "An important characteristic of gifts is that, unlike many sorts of
'income,' they cannot be counted upon in advance and may never recur. The Ross prize has this
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great weight.... Finally, requiring winners of scholarly awards to pay
taxes on them would conflict with the wise and settled policy of encour-
aging scholarly work.a"
The court of appeals placed great weight on the subjective inten-
tions of both the donor and the donee. While the outcome of the
"Ross Essay" case can be accepted in view of the court's determina-
tion that disguised compensation was not the motive for awarding the
prize,4 9 the reliance upon an amorphous subjective intention standard
to be applied on a case by case basis was likely to open up a flood gate
of litigation, and it did. During the late 1940's and early 1950's, win-
ners of essay contests, 50 door prizes, 51 lotteries, and sweepstakes52 all
disputed the taxability of their awards with mixed results.
In the midst of such confusion, it was reasonable to expect either
Congress or the United States Supreme Court to attempt to bring
order to the chaos. The Court acted first in 1952 in Robertson v.
United States.53 The taxpayer, Leroy J. Robertson, was a musician,
composer, and professor of music who between the years 1936 and
1939 had composed a symphony entitled "Trilogy." In 1945 Henry
H. Reichhold, a philanthropist and president of the Detroit Symphony
Orchestra, established a music award (the Relchhold Music Award)
offering cash prizes for the three best symphonic works written by
native-born composers of the western hemisphere. The terms of the
'48. Id. An example of the settled administrative practice may be found at Gen. Couns. Mem.
5881, 8-1 C.B. 68 (1929) which acknowledged the policy of creating tax incentives to encourage
scholarly works. The awards receiving tax exempt status in 1929 were for achievement in science
and services in promoting the public welfare.
49. See McDermott, 150 F.2d at 588:
It is safe to say that the dominant motive of a normal contestant for this prize is not a
hope of immediate financial gain. He does not regard himself as exchanging his services or
his product for money. To one whose life is devoted to scholarship and whose position is
affected by his scholarly output, the publication of an outstanding essay is its own reward
and may lead to other rewards both tangible and intangible.
50. See, eg., Amirikian v. United States, 100 F. Supp. 263 (D. Md. 1951), rev'd, 197 F.2d 442
(4th Cir. 1952) (prize held to be taxable payment in discharge of a contractual obligation where
taxpayer had written essay on naval dry docks and submitted it in a contest sponsored by the
Lincoln Arc Welding foundation); Waugh v. Commissioner, 9 T.C.M. (CCH) 309 (1950) (prize
won by taxpayer for essay on American farm economy held taxable as compensation for writing
effort); Stein v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 494 (1950) (economist who submitted prize winning plan
for the post-World War II economy to contest sponsored by a brewing company had to include
the prize as compensation income); Rev. Rul. 55-642, 1955-2 C.B. 302 (amounts received as prize
in a contest that required the submission of word puzzle solutions were taxable). Subsequent
winners of the Ross Essay Contest were advised by the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") that
their prizes would be considered taxable income. I.T. 3960, 1949-2 C.B. 13.
51. See supra note 34.
52. See supra note 31.
53. 343 U.S. 711 (1952).
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competition provided that none of the works submitted could have
been previously published or performed and that the winning compo-
sitions would remain the property of the composer except that the
Detroit Orchestra, Inc. would be granted certain limited performance
and publication rights.5"
Mr. Robertson submitted his symphony and won the $25,000 first
prize during 1947. He included that amount in his 1947 income tax
return as gross income. Thereafter, he filed a claim for refund on the
ground that the award constituted a nontaxable gift. The Commis-
sioner denied the refund claim and the taxpayer brought suit in the
federal district court in Utah which held that the award was a gift55
and, therefore, not taxable.56
The district court, citing Washburn ("Pot O'Gold") 57 and McDer-
mott ("Ross Essay"),58 applied a subjective intention test in arriving at
its conclusion. In the view of the district court, the competition spon-
sors were making a gift since they were not seeking to derive any profit
from the contest nor from the taxpayer's participation in it. With
respect to the composer's intention, the district court observed:
The taxpayer's dominant motive in composing the 'Trilogy' was not
in the hope of financial gain primarily. Like a great poet who is inspired
to write an immortal poem, the taxpayer, desiring to make an outstand-
ing contribution to the field of music, wrote this 'Trilogy' with no
thought of entering it in a contest or otherwise commercializing on it
and not until long after it was written was he prevailed upon to enter it
in the Reichhold contest and received eventually the prize-winning
award. 59
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
reversed.6 ° In holding that the award was taxable,6' the appellate
court discounted the importance and utility of the subjective intention
54. Id. at 711-12.
55. Robertson v. United States, 93 F. Supp. 660, 664 (D. Utah 1950), rev'd, 190 F.2d 680
(10th Cir. 1951), aff'd, 343 U.S. 711 (1952).
56. The court relied upon section 22(b)(3) of the 1939 Code, supra note 14:
(b) Exclusions from gross income.-The following items shall not be included in gross
income and shall be exempt from taxation under this chapter:
(3) Gifts, bequests, and devises.-The value of property acquired by gift, bequest,
devise, or inheritance.
57. Washburn v. Commissioner, 5 T.C. 1333 (1945).
58. McDermott v. Commissioner, 3 T.C. 929, rev'd, 150 F.2d 585 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
59. Robertson, 93 F. Supp. at 664.
60. United States v. Robertson, 190 F.2d 680 (10th Cir. 1951), aff'd. 343 U.S. 711 (1952).
61. Id. at 683 (the court treated the prize as compensation for the three years of professional
effort put into writing the symphony).
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test set forth in McDermott ("Ross Essay").62 The court conceded
that the taxpayer's purpose when he composed the symphony may
have been to satisfy some creative urge and not to receive income from
it. The court also conceded that the competition sponsors may not
have received anything tangible or of necessarily equal value for giving
the award. The possibility of a donative intent on the part of the
award grantor and some nonpecuniary motive on the part of the win-
ner were not held to be the controlling factors.6 3 Rather, the court
characterized Robertson's receipt of the prize as the "result of his
labors just as much as though he had sold [the symphony] or had been
paid for its use.""
The main thrust of the appellate court's opinion in Robertson was to
delineate the dividing line between nontaxable gift-awards and taxable
compensation-awards. The policy issue raised by the court in McDer-
mott, concerning the use of tax incentives to encourage scholarly or
public achievement,65 did not, however, entirely escape attention in
Robertson. The Tenth Circuit somewhat cynically offered the follow-
ing view on this question:
Nor do we believe that we can say that one entering this sort of a contest
does it purely for the advancement of art or scholarly pursuits, if so, the
contestant could well refuse to accept the prize. We hold that when a
person enters a contest, such as in this case, which offers a valuable
award and the contestant wins and accepts that award, its value is taxa-
ble to him. 66
This quotation, while couched in puritanical "virtue is its own
reward" terms, discloses a rather mean spirited tax policy which Con-
gress would reject three years later with the enactment of section 74 of
the 1954 Code.67 The Tenth Circuit felt that the prestige of winning a
prize or award given for a significant public achievement in art or
scholarship was a sufficient reward alone and that no additional tax
benefit was warranted. If the winner of a valuable award recognizing
such past achievement did not want to be taxed on the prize, he could
refuse it. This view would turn out to be astoundingly prescient of the
prize and award provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 1986.68
62. Id.
63. Id. at 682-83.
64. Id. at 683.
65. See supra text accompanying note 48.
66. Robertson, 190 F.2d at 683.
67. See infra text accompanying notes 73-84.
68. See infra text accompanying notes 165-72.
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With two federal circuit courts in conflict over the tax status of
prizes given in competitions to recognize scholarly or artistic achieve-
ment,69 the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Robertson and gained
the opportunity to resolve the issue. Perhaps, if the Court had
embraced directly either of the two competing views, it would have
been unnecessary for Congress to subsequently address the subject as
well. Unfortunately, Justice Douglas' opinion affirming the Tenth Cir-
cuit decision in Robertson introduced a surprising new theory-the
prize was taxable because it represented the discharge of a contractual
obligation. The short opinion on this issue reads in its entirety as
follows:
In the legal sense payment of a prize to a winner of a contest is the
discharge of a contractual obligation. The acceptance by the contestants
of the offer tendered by the sponsor of the contest creates an enforceable
contract. See 6 Corbin On Contracts § 1489; Restatement, Contracts,
§ 521. The discharge of legal obligations- the payment for services ren-
dered or consideration paid pursuant to a contract-is in no sense a gift.
The case would be different if an award were made in recognition of past
achievements or present abilities, or if payment was given not for serv-
ices, see Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716, 730, 49
S. Ct. 499, 504, 73 L. Ed. 918, but out of affection, respect, admiration,
charity or like impulses. Where the payment is in return for services
rendered, it is irrelevant that the donor derives no economic benefit from
it.
7 1
The Supreme Court in Robertson, like the McDermott and Wash-
burn courts, was concerned with the subjective intention of the donor
at the time of presentation of the award, but did not find it determina-
tive. Rather, the Court restricted the exclusion to cases where the sub-
jective intention was gratuitous and the donee had done nothing to
bring about the award. The prize or award could not be excluded even
though the donor received no economic benefit if the donee had ren-
dered any services or performed any act that constituted acceptance of
the "contractual" contest offer. Such efforts would be construed as
evidence that the donor had not acted out of affection, admiration,
charity, or any similar gift-related motive.72
69. The D.C. Circuit in McDermott v. Commissioner, 150 F.2d 585 (D.C. Cir. 1945), held
them to be nontaxable gifts and the Tenth Circuit in United States v. Robertson, 190 F.2d 680
(10th Cir. 1951), found them to be compensation. See supra text accompanying notes 39-49.
53-67.
70. Robertson v. United States, 342 U.S. 896 (1951) (granting certiorari).




Taxation of Prizes and Awards
It is obvious that Congress needed to provide statutory guidance.
With the comprehensive rewriting of the tax code in 1954, Congress
had the chance to specifically address the taxation of prizes and
awards. Section 74 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 was the
result.
B. Section 74 of the 1954 Code
Congress' intention in creating a separate section for prizes and
awards was to establish a set of rational and administratively workable
rules for distinguishing between taxable and nontaxable awards with-
out resort to the gift versus compensation morass.73 By placing this
section in Part II ("Items Specifically Included in Gross Income") of
Subchapter B of Chapter 1 of the Income Tax Subtitle of the Code,
Congress was adhering to its long standing comprehensive definition
of income.74 As a general rule, gross income was deemed to include
the value of amounts or items received as prizes and awards.75 Partic-
ular prizes and awards would be excepted from this general rule only
if the circumstances of their receipt complied with the requirements of
a new objective test for excludability.76
The policy underlying the exclusion, as provided in section 74(b),
was to provide a reward in the form of a tax benefit to persons who
had used their special talents for the betterment of society. The chal-
lenge for Congress in drafting the new provision was to create an
incentive for individuals to pursue altruistic goals that could benefit
society as a whole and, at the same time, to assure that game show
giveaways, door prizes, sweepstakes, lottery prizes, and awards that
were essentially compensatory in nature would be subjected to tax.77
73. See 1954 S. REP., supra note 5, at 4813; H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 11-12,
reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 4017, 4163-64 [hereinafter 1954 H.R.
REP.].
74. See supra text accompanying notes 11-21.
75. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, ch. 736, § 74(a), 68A Stat. 24, amended by Pub. L. No.
99-514, Title I, §§ 122(a)(1), 123(b)(1), 100 Stat. 2085 (1986) (subsequent references to
superseded code sections will be cited by year of enactment).
76. I.R.C. § 74(b) (1954).
77. 1954 H.R. REP., supra note 73, at 4036, provides:
Your committee's bill includes in income subject to tax all prizes and awards except those
made in recognition of past achievements of a religious, charitable, scientific, educational,
artistic, literary, or civic nature, where the recipient was selected without any action on his
part and is not required to render substantial future services. This exception is intended to
exempt such awards as the Nobel and Pulitzer prizes.
The provision eliminates the confusion resulting from certain court decisions. The Pot
O'Gold case and the Ross Essay Contest case are overruled insofar as these cases held the
receipts not to be income under the code....
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Drawing on elements identified in Robertson78 and the other earlier
decisions,7 9 Congress restricted the exclusion to prizes and awards
made primarily to recognize past achievement in seven specific fields:
Religion, charity, science, education, art, literature, and civic affairs.
Two additional requirements for excludability were provided: One, the
recipient had to be selected without any action on his part to enter the
contest or proceeding; and two, receipt of the award could not be con-
ditioned on the rendering of substantial future services by the recipi-
ent.8" The obvious purpose of these additional requirements was to
eliminate the tax-free receipt of disguised compensation.
The statute simply listed and did not define the seven areas that
were considered significant enough to warrant exclusion, nor did the
statute attempt to set forth additional guidelines. Almost immediately,
however, the Treasury Department promulgated interpretative regula-
tions8' which to a certain extent clarified the Code section and helped
ensure that cases with like factual patterns would receive similar treat-
ment.82 The regulations gave examples of both includable and exclud-
able prizes and awards and guidelines for determining the value to be
included in gross income.83 The regulations also set forth a three step
See also 1954 S. REP., supra note 5, at 4813, which states that "[a]mounts received from radio
and television giveaway shows, or as door prizes, or in any similar type contest would also not be
covered by subsection (b)."
78. Robertson v. United States, 343 U.S. 711, 71314 (1952).
79. See supra notes 34-35, 38-39, 50.
80. See I.R.C. § 74(b)(1)-(2) (1954).
81. Treas. Reg. § 1.74-1 (1955).
82. The Secretary of Treasury is given authority to promulgate interpretative regulations in
I.R.C. § 7805(a) (1954). While interpretative regulations are entitled to a presumption of
validity, they are not immune to attack from taxpayers on the grounds that they exceed or
rewrite the statute under which they were promulgated. Standards for determining the validity
of an interpretative Treasury regulation have been articulated by the Supreme Court in National
Muffler Dealers Assoc. v. United States, 440 U.S. 472 (1979), and United States v. Vogel
Fertilizer, 455 U.S. 16 (1982).
83. Treas. Reg. § 1.74-1 (1955) provides:
(a) Inclusion in gross income. (1) Section 74(a) requires the inclusion in gross income of
all amounts received as prizes and awards, unless such prizes or awards qualify as an
exclusion from gross income under subsection (b), or unless such prize or award is a
scholarship or fellowship grant excluded from gross income by section 117. Prizes and
awards which are includable in gross income include (but are not limited to) amounts
received from radio and television giveaway shows, door prizes, and awards in contests of all
types, as well as any prizes and awards from an employer to an employee in recognition of
some achievement in connection with his employment.
(2) If the prize or award is not made in money but is made in goods or services, the fair
market value of the goods or services is the amount to be included in income.
(b) Exclusion from gross income. Section 74(b) provides an exclusion from gross income
of any amount received as a prize or award, if(1) such prize or award was made primarily in
recognition of past achievements of the recipient in religious, charitable, scientific,
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test to be applied to each prize or award to determine its excludability.
The test was taken directly from the statutory language. The regula-
tion provided further that prizes such as the Nobel Prize and Pulitzer
Prize would be excludable, but that prizes and awards from an
employer to an employee in recognition of an achievement in connec-
tion with his employment would be included in gross income.
84
Section 74 as enacted in 1954 was an attempt to accomplish a
number of valid purposes: To end the confusion that had reigned in
the area of prizes and awards, to tax most prizes and awards, and to
exempt from taxation only those prizes given to recognize significant
humanitarian or public achievement. Congress was for the most part
successful in restricting the tax benefit to worthy, prize recipients while
virtually eliminating the possibility of disguised compensation.
C. The Middle Years (1954-1986)
Section 74 was created to clarify the taxation of prizes and awards
and to objectify the limited circumstances for excludability.8" The
Code section and interpretative regulations promulgated thereunder
set forth a seemingly uncomplicated three-prong test.8 6 A prize or
award was excludable: One, if made primarily in recognition of one of
the specified areas of public achievement; two, provided that the recip-
ient did not enter any contest or otherwise seek the prize; and three,
was not required to perform substantial future services as a condition
of receiving it. Unfortunately, simply setting out a tripartite rule did
not eliminate all areas of potential dispute in the application of the
rule.
One additional area in need of amplification centered around
whether the donor was awarding the prize or award for "past achieve-
ment" as required in Treasury Regulation 1.74-1(b).87 The Maria
educational, artistic, literary, or civic fields; (2) the recipient was selected without any action
on his part to enter the contest or proceedings; and (3) the recipient is not re4uired to render
substantial future services as a condition to receiving the prize or award. Thus, such awards
as the Nobel prize and the Pulitzer prize would qualify for the exclusion. Section 74(b) does
not exclude prizes or awards from an employer to an employee in recognition of some
achievement in connection with his employment.
(c) Scholarship and fellowship grants. See section 117 and the regulations thereunder for
provisions relating to scholarship and fellowship grants.
84. Id.
85. See supra text accompanying notes 73-77.
86. See I.R.C. § 74(b) (1954); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.74-1(b) (1955).
87. The requirement that the award be given for "past" achievement is not found in I.R.C.
§ 74(b) (1954) which allowed the exclusion for prizes and awards in recognition of one of the
qualified forms of achievement. However, allowance of the exclusion for contemporary or future
achievement (even in one of the qualified fields of endeavor) resembles compensation far too
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Moors Cabot prize was found to be given for past achievements in
journalism. 8 The recipient of the Cabot award was required to have
published something during the calendar year that had an effect on the
general public's awareness of currently important events. The Pulitzer
Prize had also been found to be in recognition of past achievements in
editorial writing published in a United States newspaper.89 As a result
of these early rulings, it was clear that where the recipient was
honored for achievements already accomplished and the other criteria
of section 74 were met, the award or prize would be deemed
excludable.
Not only must the prize or award have been given for past achieve-
ment, but the statute limited the areas in which the recipient must
have excelled. The areas recognized as entitled to the tax benefit9"
were, presumably, ones which Congress then viewed as central to
American values. The encouragement of these types of genuinely mer-
itorious activities appears to have been viewed as valid and legitimate
tax policy at that time. The parameters to be used in determining
whether specific conduct for which an award was given fell within one
of the seven specified areas of endeavor were developed over time in a
series of cases and rulings. Among the types of achievements which
have been recognized as falling within the statutorily enumerated cate-
gories are: Outstanding public service by a civilian in the federal gov-
ernment, 9' outstanding over-all past service to the academic work of a
closely. Therefore, the Treasury regulation attachment of the retrospective requirement (i.e.,
"past achievement") appears justified. See I MERTENS LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX
(Callaghan) § 6A.19 (Feb. 1986) which also points out that sections 74 and 117 (pertaining to
scholarships) can be reconciled in that "the former can be regarded as primarily related to the
past activities of the recipient, while Section 117 deals with prospective activities."
88. Rev. Rul. 58-59, 1958-1 C.B. 40.
89. Rev. Rul. 54-110, 1954-1 C.B. 28. This ruling was issued under the 1939 Code.
However, the Pulitzer Prize is specifically mentioned as tax exempt in the legislative history of
the 1954 Code. See supra note 77.
90. I.R.C. § 74(b) (1954) (religious, charitable, scientific, educational, artistic, literary, and
civic).
91. The tax consequences of the Rockefeller Public Service Award were the subject of
consideration by the Tax Court and the service over time. Prior to the enactment of the 1954
Code, the award was treated as a nontaxable gift. See Rev. Rul. 57-50, 1957-1 C.B. 74.
Immediately following the enactment of section 74, a recipient of the award was held taxable
because he had applied for it and was required to perform future services. See Isenbergh v.
Commissioner, 31 T.C. 1046 (1959). The award procedures were thereafter modified to change
the emphasis of the award from "future promise of the individual and his future training and
development" to past accomplishments. The selection process was also revised to eliminate
application. From that point on, the award was deemed excludable. See Rev. Rul. 61-92, 1961-1
C.B. 11; Rev. Rul. 62-89, 1962-1 C.B. 19.
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college,92 outstanding academic achievement and student citizen-
ship,93 and outstanding past work in the field of chemistry.94
A variety of other achievements for which prizes or awards were
conferred have been found to fall outside of the categories enumerated
in the statute, resulting in taxability for the winner. These include
completing twenty-five years of service with a company,95 catching a
particular fish, 96 being selected most valuable player in the National
Football League championship game,97 being selected most popular
92. Rev. Rul. 57-19, 1957-1 C.B. 33.
93. Rev. Rul. 57-67, 1957-1 C.B. 33.
94. Rev. Rul. 55-314, 1955-1 C.B. 235. Although decided under secion 22(b)(3) of the 1939
Code, supra note 14, the ruling tracks the requirements of section 74 in that the winner was being
honored for past achievement in science; he was nominated for the cash award through no action
on his part; and no future services were required.
95. Rev. Rul. 58-277, 1958-1 C.B. 41. Awards of tangible personal property not exceeding
$400 (or S1600 in certain limited circumstances) may now be received tax-free if given for length
of service or safety achievement. See I.R.C. §§ 274(c), 740) (1987). Section 274(j) was originally
introduced into the Code in 1962 as section 274(b) which permitted tax free length of service and
safety achievement awards with a value not in excess of $100. Revenue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No.
87-834, § 4(a)(1), 76 Stat. 960, 974 (1962). The award value was raised to the present limits in
1981 and an additional category of achievement was added for employee productivity. ERTA,
supra note 8, § 265(b)(3), at 265. Finally in TRA86, the subsection was renumbered section
2740) and the productivity category repealed. TRA86, supra note 3, § 122(d). An extensive
examination of the history of qualified employee achievement awards may be found in Shaviro, A
Case Study for Tax Reformers: The Taxation of Employee Awards and Other Business Gifts, 4 VA.
TAx REv. 241 (1985).
96. Simmons v. United States, 197 F. Supp. 673 (D. Md. 1961), aff'd, 308 F.2d 160 (4th Cir.
1962). American Brewery sponsored the third annual American Beer Fishing Derby in 1958.
With the cooperation of state game officials, the brewery placed tagged fish in Chesapeake Bay
and offered cash prizes to anybody who could prove that they had caught them on hook and line.
The taxpayer caught "Diamond Jim III," a rock fish, and won the $25,000 first prize. In the tax
litigation that ensued, he contended that this constituted a civic achievement and that the section
74(b) exclusion ought to apply since the section's other requirements were met. The court of
appeals rejected taxpayer's argument and suggested that the term civic achievement "implies
positive action, exemplary, unselfish, and broadly advantageous to the community." Simmons,
308 F.2d at 163. Taxpayer's conduct did not meet this standard:
Viewing the facts most favorably to the taxpayer, we hold that he was not rewarded for a
civic achievement, properly interpreted. There was nothing meritorious in a civic sense in
catching this rock fish. Simmons was not even rewarded for an extraordinary display of
skill, if that could be considered a civic achievement, for catching Diamond Jim III was
essentially a matter of luck. The case might be different if, for example, Simmons had at
considerable risk to himself captured and destroyed a killer whale terrorizing the Maryland
seashore. That could have been regarded as a genuine civic achievement. But catching this
fish cannot reasonably be so denominated, for the only community interest in the event was
one of idle curiosity.
Id. at 163-64.
97. Hornung v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 428 (1967). The taxpayer, Paul Hornung, was a
member of the Green Bay Packers professional football team during the 1950's and 1960's. The
National Football League Championship game for the 1961 season was played in Green Bay,
Wisconsin on December 31, 1961. Hornung was named most valuable player by the editors of
Sport Magazine. The award included a 1962 Chevrolet Corvette which was physically delivered
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member of the Los Angeles Dodgers and outstanding professional ath-
lete of the year,9 8 being an average American family,9 9 and winning a
beauty pageant. " A variety of incentive awards for attaining sales
quotas or bringing in new business have also been held taxable for lack
of sufficiently public achievement."'' It is clear from the above that
the courts and the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") have construed
the seven areas listed in section 74(b) to be exhaustive and not
illustrative.
to taxpayer in New York City on January 3, 1962. Although one of the matters to be resolved
was whether the car had been constructively received in 1961, the primary issue was whether the
award had been given in recognition of educational, artistic, scientific, or civic achievement and
was therefore excludable from gross income. The Tax Court tackled that question as follows:
We feel confident that Congress had no intention of allowing professional football to
constitute a type of activity for which proficiency could be recognized with an exempt award
under section 74(b). Professional football cannot be viewed as an "educational," "artistic,"
"scientific," or "civic" field of endeavor as those terms are used in the statute no matter how
fond of the sport we may be. The crucial question for qualification under section 74(b) is the
nature of the activity awarded .... [Citation omitted.] Had Congress intended to except
prizes or awards for recognition of athletic prowess or achievement it could readily and
easily have done so; as provided now however, no such exception can be read into the
statutory language used.
Id. at 437.
98. Wills v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 308 (1967), aff'd, 411 F.2d 537 (9th Cir. 1969). The
taxpayer, Maury Wills, was a professional baseball player from 1951 through 1966. During
1962, taxpayer broke the major league record for the most stolen bases in one season; was voted
"player of the game" in the 1962 All Star Game; was voted National League most valuable
player; and athlete or man of the year by the Associated Press, Sport Magazine, the Baseball
Writers, and the State of California. He also received a new MG for being elected most popular
Dodger by the patrons at the final game of the season. In addition, he received the S. Rae
Hickok gold and jewel encrusted belt for being selected outstanding professional athlete of 1962.
In determining that the value of the car and belt were includable in taxpayer's income, the court
of appeals cited Simmons, 197 F. Supp. 673, and Hornung, 47 T.C. 428, and observed:
In light of the above standards for characterizing an activity as a civic achievement, we
cannot say that the Tax Court's finding that Wills received the car and belt .for his
popularity and athletic prowess and that these accomplishments did not constitute civic
achievements, was clearly erroneous.
Nor can we hold that the Tax Court clearly erred in finding that Wills was not rewarded
for artistic achievements. As the term "artistic" is ordinarily used, it connotes activities of
an aesthetic nature, including, for example, painting, drawing, architecture, sculpture,
poetry, music, dancing and dramatics. In normal parlance, athletic achievements are not
regarded as "artistic," despite the great skill which is frequently necessary for athletic
success.
Wills, 411 F.2d at 542.
99. Rev. Rul. 58-354, 1958-2 C.B. 36.
100. Wilson v. United States, 322 F. Supp. 830 (D. Kan. 1971); Rev. Rul. 68-20, 1968-1 C.B.
55.
101. See Bell Elec. Co. v. Commissioner, 45 T.C. 158 (1965); McCoy v. Commissioner, 38
T.C. 841 (1962); Lynch v. Commissioner, 45 T.C.M. (CCH) 1125 (1983); Hilliker v.
Commissioner, 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 896 (1972); McDonnell v. Commissioner, 26 T.C.M. (CCH)
115 (1967); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 85-20-014 (Feb. 11, 1985).
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The significant public achievement prong of section 74 eliminated
the possibility that a prize or award such as the Pot O'Gold prize in
Washburn'o2 could be excluded from gross income. Although the
winner in Washburn did not enter the contest, nor was she required to
perform any future services to receive the money, such a prize would
be taxed under section 74 since it was not given in recognition of any
significant public achievement. Thus, Congress insured that the exclu-
sion would only be available to those whose endeavors could benefit
society as a whole, and not available to those who by the luck of the
draw received income in the form of a valuable door prize, game show
giveaway, sweepstakes or lottery winning. 103
A second area of controversy centered on prong two of the statute
and regulations. In an effort to prevent extending tax-free treatment
to prizes which were compensatory or quasi-contractual in nature, the
statute required that the recipient be selected without any action on
his part to enter the contest or proceedings or to otherwise submit
himself or his work for consideration.' °4 Among the awards and
prizes which were found not to qualify for exclusion on this ground
were essay contests, 10 5 puzzle solving competitions,'06 all raiffie, lottery
or door prizes, 1 7 any prize or award given by a radio or television
game show, 0 8 and awards where the recipient solicited the prize. 109
102. Washburn v. Commissioner, 5 T.C. 1333 (1945).
103. See supra note 77.
104. See I.R.C. § 74(b)(1) (1954).
105. See Teschner v. Commissioner, 38 T.C. 1003 (1962); Rev. Rul. 58-101, 1958-1 C.B. 233;
Rev. Rul. 58-127, 1958-1 C.B. 42.
106. See Rev. Rul. 66-291, 1966-2 C.B. 279; Rev. Rul. 55-642, 1955-2 C.B. 302.
107. See Anastasio v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 814 (proceeds of New York State lottery
taxable), aff'd, 41 A.F.T.R.2d (P--) 78-328 (2d Cir. 1977); Macri Corp. v. Commissioner, 35
T.C.M. (CCH) 1190, 1210 (1976) (value of automobile won in raffle held taxable); Pulsifer v.
Commissioner, 64 T.C. 245 (1975) (Irish sweepstakes winnings taxable); Rev. Rul. 69-510, 1969-
2 C.B. 23 (automobile won as door prize taxable to winner); Rev. Rul. 55-638, 1955-2 C.B. 35
(sweepstakes prize won by individual who had received ticket as gift is not excludable under
I.R.C. § 102); Rev. Rul. 67-40, 1967-1 C.B. 19 (recipient of prize coupon that entitled holder to
purchase major appliance for nominal price held taxable on difference between the fair market
value of the item and the price paid pursuant to the coupon).
108. See Rev. Rul. 58-235, 1958-1 C.B. 26; Rev. Rul. 58-347, 1958-2 C.B. 878.
109. See Wilson v. United States, 322 F. Supp. 830 (D. Kan. 1971) (winner of Miss America
contest held taxable on cash and merchandise awarded where she had entered the contest
proceedings); Rev. Rul. 65-161, 1965-1 C.B. 38 (winner of prize given for significant civic
achievement held taxable because taxpayer initiated the result by entering the contest); Rev. Rul.
65-58, 1965-1 C.B. 37 (winner of "scholarship" prize offered by a business was not entitled to
exclusion available under either section 74, because he entered proceeding, or section 117,
because there was no requirement that the prize be used for education). But cf Rev. Rul. 57-67,
1957-1 C.B. 33 (appearance by students, nominated by faculty, at an interview before selection of
final winner of academic prize did not constitute "the participation in a contest or proceeding
within the meaning of section 74 (b)").
Washington Law Review Vol. 63:257, 1988
The final test that an excludable prize or award was required to
meet was also designed to prevent the giving of disguised compensa-
tion. If receipt of the award or prize was conditioned on the recipient
rendering substantial future services, the award would not qualify for
the exclusion."' The obligation to perform future services has
resulted in the includability in gross income of prizes or awards to
individuals ranging from research scientists..' to beauty contest
winners.' 12
The case law interpreting section 74 produced results consistent
with the underlying reasons for its adoption. 1 3 The specific areas of
110. I.R.C. § 74(b)(2) (1954).
11I. Mueller v. Commissioner, 41 T.C. 639, aff'd, 338 F.2d 1015 (Ist Cir. 1964). Scientists
selected, without effort on their part, by the Institute for Muscle Research to receive research
award were denied section 74(b) exclusion since the award was not given for past scientific
achievement, but to enable winners to conduct future research project:
While taxpayers were undoubtedly chosen initially on the basis of their experience and
achievements, their selection was not based upon any formal competition, or as a result of
any contest. Their research activity at the laboratory was required to be, according to the
undisputed testimony of the Institute's director of research, "something which contributed
to our common ideas." If it did contribute, the "awards" might continue indefinitely. On
the other hand if performance failed to live up to the director's "expectations," or if a
taxpayer chose to work elsewhere, his "award" terminated forthwith.
338 F.2d at 1016.
112. Rev. Rul. 68-20, 1968-1 C.B. 55. Taxpayer was a participant in and winner of a national
beauty contest. The prizes included a four year "scholarship" to the college of her choice, fixed
daily sums for personal appearances, fixed hourly amounts for modeling assignments, a new
automobile, an expense allowance, and a variety of apparel and cosmetic items. Prior to
competing in the national contest, taxpayer had signed a contract setting forth her duties as a
participant in the national contest and as the possible national winner (such winner being
obligated to accept employment by the contest sponsor for one year and to appear for the next
year's contest as directed). The various prizes were held includable in income under section
74(a).
113. In addition to the cases and rulings discussed in supra notes 89-112, a number of other
issues have arisen in connection with prizes and awards since the introduction of section 74 in
1954. Certain of these instances have involved questions of valuation of prizes won in kind. See
Macri Corp. v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 1190 (1976) (fair market value of automobile
won by taxpayer in raffle and sold by him within a few days of delivery for $2550 found by Tax
Court to be $4000); McCoy v. Commissioner, 38 T.C. 841 (1962) (fair market value of
automobile received as award in a sales contest which had cost donor $4452 and which winner
disposed of within ten days for $3600 determined to be $3900); Rev. Rul. 58-347, 1958-2 C.B.
878 (producers of television game shows advised to issue Form 1099 to winners valuing
merchandise prizes at manufacturer's suggested retail price). Cash prizes which were to be
received in installments or at a deferred point in time have been considered. See Rev. Rul. 84-9,
1984-1 C.B. 22 (fact that otherwise excludable section 74(b) prize or award was to be received in
annual payments for a fixed term or for life does not affect excludability); Rev. Rul. 62-74, 1962-1
C.B. 68 (value of cash prize placed in escrow with receipt deferred by fixed period calculated by
normal present value discount methods). Also, attempts by persons selected as prize winners to
assign the winnings to others have been the subject of concern. These have generally been
resolved under traditional assignment of earned income doctrine. See Rev. Rul. 58-127, 1958-1
C.B. 42 (essay contest award won by parent but deposited for use of child towards child's
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achievement delineated in the Code were construed as exclusive and
interpreted narrowly. Only prizes and awards for genuinely meritori-
ous past achievement in areas that benefited humanity were considered
as excludable under section 74. The cases and rulings did not recog-
nize the donee's subjective reasons for entering a contest; entry dic-
tated inclusion and therefore endless litigation was foreclosed. The
chance of disguised compensation beifng received as a tax-free award
was virtually eliminated since one could not perform any act of solici-
tation or be required to render any services subsequent to receipt of
the prize. In fact, the case law seemed settled until a decision by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit created uncer-
tainty in the area of employer awards to employees. 114
D. Employer-Employee Awards: A Problem Area
During the three decades following the enactment of section 74, the
parameters governing its application developed in a fairly predictable
fashion. Only in the area of employer awards to employees had any
controversy developed during the period immediately preceding the
tax reform efforts of the mid-1980's. The 1954 statute provided no spe-
cific guidelines to determine when an employer award to an employee
would be excludable.' 15 However, reason would dictate that the same
criteria developed in the cases and rulings discussed previously would
be used.
Subsequent to the enactment of section 74, an interpretative regula-
tion was promulgated by the Treasury Department that construed the
statute to prohibit the exemption of awards by employers to employees
in recognition of some achievement connected with their employ-
ment.' 6 Courts and the Internal Revenue Service consistently fol-
education taxed to parent); Rev. Rul. 58-235, 1958-1 C.B. 26 (taxpayer who was executive
director of a tax exempt organization held taxable where he assigned cash prizes won by him on
television quiz show directly to the organization). But cf Teschner v. Commissioner, 38 T.C.
1003 (1962) (taxpayer who had entered essay contest and had designated his daughter on the
entry as the prize recipient was not required to include prize in his income).
114. See generally Comment, Jones v. Commissioner: Employment-Related Awards Under
Section 74, 39 TAx LAW. 175 (1985); Note, .R.C Section 74 and Jones v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue: An Award-Winning Decision, 27 ARIZ. L. REV. 585 (1985); Note, Federal
Income Taxation-Awards from Employers to Employees in Recognition of Achievements
Connected with Employment May Be Excluded from Gross Income Under Section 74 of the
Internal Revenue Code, 58 TEMP. L.Q. 693 (1985); Hoffman, Jr. & Thompson, Recent Decision
Offers Possibilities of Making Nontaxable Awards to Employees, 65 J. TAX'N 46 (1986).
115. Compare the discussion of qualified employee achievement awards under section 274 for
length of service, productivity, or safety achievement at supra note 95.
116. See Treas. Reg. § 1.74-1(a)(1), (b) (1955).
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lowed this regulation until Jones v. Commissioner. "7 In Jones the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed a decision of the Tax
Court and held that the regulation was overly broad as applied to the
facts and circumstances of that case.
Prior to the Jones decision the Service relied upon the regulation to
establish a "bright-line" test.118 The test was simple. If a prize or
award was presented by an employer to an employee in recognition of
some employment related achievement, it was includable in gross
income. Two early revenue rulings illustrate the effect of the regula-
tion. The rulings involved awards to college faculty members for out-
standing academic service to the employer institution. In both
instances, the award was for past educational achievement and the
recipients neither applied for consideration nor were they required to
perform future services. The funding for each award came from an
outside foundation. Where the selection of the winners was made by
an executive committee of the employer institution for the purpose of
supplementing the compensation of the recipient faculty members, the
award was held taxable. 119 However, where an independent selection
process was utilized, the award was excludable from gross income as a
section 74(b) educational achievement award.12 The distinction is
that in the one case the direct employer-employee relationship made
disguised compensation a distinct possibility, while the insulation of
an independent selection process for the other award negated this
possibility. 21
An even more obvious application of the regulation's "bright-line"
test is illustrated by Revenue Ruling 67-89.122 In that instance, an
award received by a United States Army nurse selected by her com-
manding officer for outstanding performance in connection with her
employment was deemed includable. Instead of government funds,
the source of the award was a donation by an individual to honor his
late wife who had been an army nurse. Nonetheless, the award was
summarily included in the recipient's gross income under Regulation
section 1.74-1(b). This "bright-line" test, while not permitting a case
by case examination of the equities, does, however, virtually eliminate
117. 743 F.2d 1429 (9th Cir. 1984), revg 79 T.C. 1008 (1982).
118. Id. at 1433.
119. Rev. Rul. 57-460, 1957-2 C.B. 69.
120. Rev. Rul. 57-19, 1957-1 C.B. 33 (committee of university students, alumni, and
administrators selected the winner from a list provided by the graduating class and alumni).
121. Other instances where awards for superior teaching have been found taxable under the
authority of Treas. Reg. § 1.74-1(b) (1955) may be found at Priv. Ltr. Rul. 86-40-034 (July 3,
1986) and Priv. Ltr. Rul. 84-42-027 (July 12, 1984).
122. Rev. Rul. 67-89, 1967-1 C.B. 20.
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the likelihood of tax-free receipt of disguised compensation in most
employer to employee awards. 123
Prior to Revenue Ruling 67-89, the United States Court of Claims
in Griggs v. United States124 had considered whether an award made
to a federal employee under the Government Employees' Incentive
Awards Act 125 should be taxed as income. The recipient, in the nor-
mal course of his employment, had formulated and negotiated a
freight rate formula which saved the government millions of dollars
for the transportation of rockets and rocket components. He was
awarded approximately $8000 under the Incentive Awards Act. The
court found that the award was given for an accomplishment in con-
nection with taxpayer's employment and cited Regulation section
1.74-1(b), but did not rely on it. Rather, the court held that the award
was in recognition of a technical not scientific achievement and for
that reason not excludable under section 74. 126
The Tax Court, one year later, in Denniston v. Commissioner, 27 was
also faced with the issue of the taxability of awards given under the
Government Employees' Incentive Awards Act. The taxpayer had, in
the course of his employment, obtained substantial cost savings for the
government on telephone and other communication services for which
he received a $3000 incentive award. He maintained that the award
was in recognition of civic achievement and that all of the elements of
section 74(b) were present.' 28 The selection was made without any
action on his part and he was not required to render substantial future
123. See also Priv. Ltr. Rul. 86-30-001 (Dec. 24, 1985) which denied the exclusion to the
recipient of a foundation award for medical research productivity. Because officials of the
recipient's employer (a medical college and hospital) comprised the foundation board and were
involved in the selection process, the award was viewed as coming from employer to employee
for some employment related achievement.
124. 314 F.2d 515 (Ct. Cl. 1963).
125. See Government Employees' Incentive Awards Act, Pub. L. No. 763, § 304, 68 Stat.
1105, 1113 (1954) (current version at 5 U.S.C. § 4501-4514 (1982)), which provided:
(a) The head of each department is authorized to pay cash awards to ... civilian officers
and employees of the Government who by their suggestions, inventions, superior
accomplishments, or other personal efforts contribute to the efficiency, economy, or other
improvement of Government operations or who perform special acts or services in the
public interest in connection with or related to their official employment.
(d) A cash award under this section shall be in addition to the regular compensation of
the recipient and the acceptance of such cash award shall constitute an agreement that the
use by the Government of the United States or the municipal government of the District of
Columbia of any idea, method or device for which the award is made shall not form the
basis of a further claim of any nature upon the Government ....
126. Griggs, 314 F.2d at 516-17.
127. 41 T.C. 667 (1964), aff'd per curiam, 343 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
128. Id. at 670.
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services as a condition of receiving the award. Although the Tax
Court made reference to Griggs, 129 it chose not to base its decision on
any semantic exercise such as the "technical" versus "scientific" dis-
tinction drawn by the Court of Claims.
The Tax Court found that the award to Denniston was compensa-
tory in nature and fell directly within the provision of Regulation sec-
tion 1.74-1(b). 30 The taxpayer contended that the regulation was not
a valid interpretation of section 74(b) or its legislative intent, since the
wording of the statute omitted such a flat prohibition of the exclusion
for any awards given in the employer-employee setting. In response,
the Tax Court stated:
We do not read the regulations in question as setting forth the broad
principle that under no circumstances can a payment by an employer to
an employee come within the exclusion. Rather, such regulations pro-
vide that there can be no exclusion under section 74(b) where a prize or
an award is given by an employer to an employee in recognition of some
achievement in connection with his employment. Actually, the congres-
sional committee reports in connection with the enactment of section 74
of the 1954 Code . . . specifically state that section 74(b) was not
intended to exclude from income prizes or awards from an employer to
an employee in recognition of some achievement in connection with his
employment.' 31
The Tax Court was clearly suggesting that a prize or award given by
an employer to an employee for outstanding achievement outside of
his employment could be excludable. This award, however, was given
to the taxpayer to compensate him for his outstanding performance in
connection with his employment and was, therefore, taxable. The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed, per
curiam, observing that the Government Employees' Incentive Awards
Act by its own terms limited eligibility for the awards to those govern-
ment employees who "contribute to the efficiency, economy, or other
improvement of Government operations or who perform special acts
or services in the public interest in connection with or related to their
official employment."' 32
The results reached in Griggs and Denniston were consistent,
although the grounds upon which the decisions were reached were dis-
tinct. Awards given under the Government Employees' Incentive
129. Griggs, 314 F.2d 515.
130. Denniston, 41 T.C. at 672.
131. Id. at 672-73 (emphasis in original).
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Awards Act would be deemed taxable, precluding the possibility of
tax-free receipt of disguised compensation.
The incentive award act involved in the two prior cases is not the
only governmentally administered award program whose tax conse-
quences have been the subject of dispute. The National Aeronautics
and Space Act of 1958 provided for the Administrator of NASA to
make monetary awards for any scientific or technical contribution to
that agency which he determined to have significant value in the con-
duct of aeronautical and space activities. Recipients eligible to receive
such awards include employees of the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration ("NASA"), employees of a NASA contractor,
employees of other government agencies, and third parties making sig-
nificant contributions to the space program.133 Undoubtedly, the initi-
ation of this particular incentive award program was spurred by the
Soviet Union's launch on October 4, 1957, of the first earth-orbiting
satellite, Sputnik I.
The question of whether an award made by NASA under section
306 of its enabling act could be excludable from gross income under
Code section 74(b) was first considered in Revenue Ruling 69-129.134
That ruling reviewed the NASA award program noting that recipients
of the awards were required to surrender all claims to any compensa-
tion, other than the award, for the use, by the United States, of their
contribution. The awards were, therefore, in the Service's view, basi-
cally compensatory in nature.135 Somewhat surprisingly, Revenue
Ruling 69-129 does not make reference to Regulation section 1.74-1(b)
as additional authority.
In 1972, the correctness of the Service's position on these section
306 awards was tested in federal district court in Rogallo v. United
States. 136 In that case, a long term employee of NASA and his wife
had received a section 306 award from NASA in the amount of
$35,000 in connection with their invention and development of the
parawing (a nonrigid flying structure ultimately used in space recovery
devices and military vehicles). At the time of the award, the Rogallos
133. National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-568, § 306, 72 Stat. 426,
437 (1958) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2451-2484 (1982)).
134. Rev. Rul. 69-129, 1969-1 C.B. 35.
135. Id. at 35:
The awards granted under section 306 of the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958
are not made primarily in recognition of achievement within the meaning of section 74(b) of
the Code. These awards are made on the basis of the value of the work done to the grantor,
and the grantor's purpose in making them is to reward and provide incentive for
contributions that advance its goals and interests.
136. 341 F. Supp. 998 (E.D. Va. 1972), rev"d, 475 F.2d 1 (4th Cir. 1973).
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were required to and did execute in favor of the government a nonex-
clusive royalty free license for use of their invention. 3 7 The taxpayers
and the government agreed that NASA selected the Rogallos for the
award without any action or application on their part, they were not
required to render substantial future services as a condition of receiv-
ing the award, the award was not made for an accomplishment in con-
nection with Mr. Rogallo's employment but was developed by the
taxpayers on their own time, and the invention was in the scientific
field of aeronautics.
In view of these agreed facts, the district court found the award to
Mr. and Mrs. Rogallo to be excludable under section 74(b), notwith-
standing the government's assertion that the award had been given
primarily in exchange for the royalty free license and not primarily in
recognition of scientific achievement. 38 In so ruling, the district court
alluded, as had earlier courts,1 39 to the policy supporting tax benefits
to encourage significant public achievement: "Lastly, it rubs across the
grain of this court to 'award' something with one hand-unsolicited-
for scientific achievement, and then reclaim 50% of the 'award' with
the other." 4'
The Rogallo decision was appealed by the government to the Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit which reversed.'41 The court of
appeals disagreed with the district court as to the reason for the giving
of the award:
The award received by the Rogallos was an honor, and the Rogallos
could well have perceived it solely as such, so that we are sympathetic to
their claim. But we conclude that, in fact and in law, the award was not
"primarily in recognition" of their invention of the parawing. NASA
made the award not primarily for their act of invention, but for their act
of contributing the invention to NASA. Without this contribution and
the royalty-free irrevocable license, there would have been no award.
The award was not therefore gratuitous and should not be excluded
from gross income under § 74(b). 142
After almost thirty years of cases and rulings denying the section
74(b) exclusion to employer awards to employees, we arrive at Jones v.
Commissioner. ' Like the Rogallos, Mr. Jones was the recipient of an
137. Id. at 999-1000.
138. Id. at 1000.
139. See, e.g.. McDermott v. Commissioner, 150 F.2d 585, 588 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
140. Rogallo, 341 F. Supp. at 1000-01.
141. Rogallo v. United States, 475 F.2d 1 (4th Cir. 1973).
142. Id. at 7.
143. Jones v. Commissioner, 743 F.2d 1429 (9th Cir. 1984).
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award from NASA pursuant to section 306. The issue again was
whether the award was excludable under section 74(b). The Tax
Court's finding was consistent with prior law: The award received by
Jones from his employer was taxable income. The case was appealed
to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit which reversed Chief
Judge Tannenwald's decision and set in motion the chain of events
leading to the amendment of section 74 in the Tax Reform Act of
1986.
The facts in Jones were undisputed. Robert Jones is an award win-
ning aerodynamicist t" who had been employed by the federal govern-
ment for over thirty years designing and improving aircraft. He
designed the swept-wing jet aircraft and later invented the oblique
wing aircraft. 145 His contributions to the aerodynamics industry were
unparalleled. In 1974 NASA officials submitted an application for a
section 306 award to be given to Jones for the oblique wing design.
NASA's awards board initially considered giving Jones an award in
the range of $1500 to $2000. 146
Before the awards board finalized its decision, the Technical Infor-
mation Division of NASA (to celebrate Jones' sixty-fifth birthday)
compiled a volume of his scientific papers and articles entitled "Col-
lected Works of Robert T. Jones."147 After reviewing this volume, the
awards board decided to give the taxpayer a $15,000 award for "the
totality of his scientific contribution to the conduct of NASA pro-
144. The court of appeals recited a litany of Dr. Jones' awards as follows:
Jones has received several other awards and honors. In 1946 he received the Sylvanus
Albert Reed Award from the Institute of Aeronautical Science for his discoveries
concerning airflow at subsonic and supersonic speeds. In 1971 the University of Colorado
awarded him an honorary Doctor of Science degree. The German aerospace society,
Deutsche Gesellschaft Fur Luft und Raumfahrt e.V., gave him its highest award in 1978. In
1981 he received the President's Award for Distinguished Civilian Service and the
Smithsonian Institution's Langley Medal, one of only 17 such awards presented in this
century.
Id. at 1431.
145. The Tax Court described these accomplishments as follows:
The swept-wing design, which was a fundamental advance towards supersonic flight,
involves wings which are at an acute angle to the fuselage of the aircraft. In the 1970's,
petitioner began serious work on the "Oblique-Wing Supersonic Aircraft," a design in which
the wing, mounted on top of the fuselage, pivots at the center. When the plane takes off, the
wing is perpendicular to the fuselage; when it is in the air, the wing can be swiveled so it is
almost parallel with the fuselage. Some time prior to August 12, 1974, petitioner assigned
his patent rights in the oblique-wing aircraft to the United States of America as represented
by the administrator of NASA.
Jones v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 1008, 1009-10 (1982).
146. Id. at 1011.
147. The majority of papers in this volume deals with aeronautics. However, papers on
optics, relativistic kinematics, biomechanics, and violins also are included. Id. at 1010.
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grams in aeronautics and space, and to advancement of scientific
knowledge." '4 8 Mr. Jones excluded the award from gross income, and
the Service proposed a deficiency in tax leading to the Tax Court
proceeding.
Before the Tax Court, the parties stipulated that Jones' aeronautical
inventions, innovations, and discoveries qualified as scientific achieve-
ments, the award was made to him in recognition thereof, he did not
take any action to solicit the award, and that he was not required to
perform substantial future services as a condition of receiving it. The
taxpayer therefore asserted that all requirements of section 74(b) had
been met and that the money was properly excluded from gross
income. In Jones' view, the award was "honorific rather than com-
pensatory." 149 The government countered with two alternative argu-
ments: Either the NASA award program only had statutory authority
to confer compensatory awards which, because of the quid pro quo
involved, are not awards "primarily in recognition of" scientific
achievement (the Rogallo argument); or the award was from tax-
payer's employer in recognition of some achievement in connection
with his employment (the Regulation section 1.74-1(b) argument). 5 °
The Tax Court found it unnecessary to resolve the Rogallo issue
since it concluded that the award was essentially given in recognition
of employment related activities and therefore taxable.1 "' This out-
come was, of course, consistent with the "bright-line" test from Treas-
ury Regulation section 1.74-1. While upholding the validity of the
regulation in this case, the Tax Court, echoing its opinion in Dennis-
ton, 152 indicated that it would not necessarily find every award from
an employer to an employee to be disqualified from the section 74(b)
exclusion. '5 3
148. Jones, 743 F.2d at 1431.
149. Jones, 79 T.C. at 1012.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 1013:
Admittedly, the award had overtones of recognition of petitioner's lifelong achievements
independent of his employment by NASA. However, petitioner's activities in respect of the
oblique-wing design, incorporated in the patent which he assigned to NASA, were the
cutting edge of the recommendation which led to the award, and it is clear to us that, but for
these activities and his employment by NASA, the award would not have been made.
152. Denniston v. Commissioner, 41 T.C. 667 (1964), aff'd per curiam, 343 F.2d 312 (D.C.
Cir. 1965); see supra text accompanying note 127.
153. Jones, 79 T.C. at 1013:
He [Jones] argues that the provisions of section 1.74-1, Income Tax Regs ..... should not
be interpreted as excluding from section 74(b) every award by an employer to an employee.
We do not disagree with petitioner, but we do not think that it necessarily follows that he
Vol. 63:257, 1988
Taxation of Prizes and Awards
The Tax Court's decision in Jones was appealed by the taxpayer to
the Ninth Circuit, which found the regulation was overly broad as
written and devoured the statute.154 The court distinguished Rogallo,
Griggs, and Denniston on the grounds that the awards therein were all
compensatory in nature. 5 ' It discredited Revenue Ruling 67-89 (the
army nurse performance award) for having little reasoning and for
being reflective of the "bright line" appeal of the regulation. If under
the facts and circumstances of a given case it seemed that an
employer's purpose was to disguise compensation, then the amount of
the award was certainly includable in gross income.56 However, the
court stated that "[w]hen an employer makes an award out of a desire
to honor, or to show respect or admiration for, an employee, and the
award is not compensation for some recent benefit to the employer, the
award should be excluded under section 74 if it otherwise qualifies for
exclusion." '157 When this standard was applied to the Jones case the
award was found to be excludable. In Revenue Ruling 86-31, i"8 the
Service declined to follow the Ninth Circuit's Jones opinion and stated
that it would continue to follow Treasury Regulation section 1.74-1(b)
and Revenue Ruling 69-129.159
While this decision was the first to allow an exclusion for an award
by the government to one of its employees in recognition of achieve-
ments made in connection with employment, the criteria utilized were
certainly not novel. More than thirty years earlier in Robetson, 160
Justice Douglas set forth similar grounds which would justify exclud-
ability (i.e., award made in recognition of past achievements, not for
services, and out of affection, respect, or admiration). Therefore, the
Jones court did not create a new test, but simply declined to follow the
"bright-line" test associated with the regulations.
In Jones, the Ninth Circuit was concerned with equity and fairness.
It found the facts and circumstances did not give rise to a presumption
should prevail. The question still remains as to whether petitioner received the NASA
award "in recognition of some achievement in connection with his employment."
154. Jones v. Commissioner, 743 F.2d 1429, 1433 (9th Cir. 1984).
155. Id. The court found that in Rogallo the inventors had been required to execute a license
as a condition to the award and that the award was therefore compensatory. In Denniston and
Griggs the employees had been performing their ordinary duties and had received monetary




158. Rev. Rul. 86-31, 1986-1 C.B. 75.
159. Rev. Rul. 69-129, 1969-1 C.B. 35.




that the award was for services rendered. 6' Therefore, to automati-
cally tax the award because it was from an employer was unfair. In
balancing fairness in the individual case with the need for judicial
economy, fairness prevailed. The court observed that its "approach
may make a little more work for the commissioner and the courts, but
their job is to decide cases despite the inconvenience of doing so. '"162
Regardless of whether the Ninth Circuit's Jones decision was cor-
rect under the particular facts and circumstances involved, it
threatened to open a loophole the Service had thought was closed by
the "bright-line" test in Regulation section 1.74-1. The possibility that
employers could disguise compensation as honorific awards which
might be received tax-free by employees was one factor that led Con-
gress to react in 1986.
E. Tax Reform Act of 1986 Changes in Section 74(b)
Section 74(b), while not eliminated from the Code, has been dramat-
ically changed by the Tax Reform Act of 1986.63 Beginning January
1, 1987, the individual taxpayer can no longer economically benefit
from the prize or award while having the added benefit of a tax exclu-
sion for the amount received. The fair market value of the previously
excludable prize or award must now be included in the recipient's
gross income unless the taxpayer assigns the prize or award to char-
161. Jones v. Commissioner, 743 F.2d 1429, 1433 (9th Cir. 1984).
162. Id.
163. TRA86, supra note 3, § 122(a) amended Code section 74(a) and (b) to read:
§ 74. Prizes and awards
(a) General Rule.-Except as otherwise provided in this section or in section 117
(relating to qualified scholarships), gross income includes amounts received as prizes and
awards.
(b) Exception for Certain Prizes and Awards Transferred to Charities.-Gross income
does not include amounts received as prizes and awards made primarily in recognition of
religious, charitable, scientific, educational, artistic, literary, or civic achievement, but only
if-
(1) the recipient was selected without any action on his part to enter the contest or
proceeding;
(2) the recipient is not required to render substantial future services as a condition to
receiving the prize or award; and
(3) the prize or award is transferred by the payor to a governmental unit or organization
described in paragraph (1) or (2) of section 170(c) pursuant to a designation made by the
recipient.
Section 122(a) of TRA86 also added a new sub-section (c) to section 74. See I.R.C. § 74(c)
(1987). This new subsection relates to employee achievement awards for length of service and
safety achievement discussed supra at note 95. Prior to the enactment of TRA86, such awards
were excluded from gross income under Code section 102(a) as gifts from the employer. Section
122 (a) and (b) of TRA86 make it clear that henceforth such awards will be excludable, if at all,
under the authority of new Code section 74(c).
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ity.'" The three prong test for excludability has now become a four
prong test, with the final prong being the total relinquishment of the
right to the benefit prior to the actual receipt of the prize or award.'65
The assignee or alternate recipient of the prize or award must be a
governmental unit or qualified charitable organization.166 Therefore,
prizes such as the Nobel Prize or Pulitzer Prize (even though never
taxed before) will be taxable to the winner unless given away. 167
This new rule harkens back to the Tenth Circuit's 1951 opinion in
Robertson. 168  To avoid being taxed on an award for a public or
humanitarian achievement, the winner must refuse the prize. The tax-
payer then will be left with the prestige of having been selected and the
warm feeling of beneficence that a philanthropist gets from giving
money to a favorite charity. It appears, at least on the surface, that
Congress has adopted a tax policy of "virtue is its own reward."
All that remains of the long-standing and settled policy of encourag-
ing scholarly, scientific, charitable, and similar public achievements is
the self-satisfaction that one receiving an award or prize may experi-
ence by giving it away. The selective elimination of this particular tax
preference can only be viewed as an implicit statement that rewarding
members of society with tax exclusions, when they have been honored
for their altruistic endeavors to better mankind, is no longer an inher-
ent goal under the Internal Revenue Code. Since Congress has not
164. I.R.C. § 74(c) (1987).
165. See S. REP. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 50, reprinted in vol. 3 1986-3 C.B. 50
[hereinafter 1986 S. REP.] which provides:
In addition, in order to qualify for the section 74(b) exclusion as modified by the bill, the
designation must be made by the taxpayer, and must be carried out by the organization
making the prize or award, before the taxpayer uses the item that is awarded (e.g., in the
case of an award of money, before the taxpayer spends, deposits, invests, or otherwise uses
the money). Disqualifying uses by the taxpayer include such uses of the property with the
permission of the taxpayer or by one associated with the taxpayer (e.g., a member of the
taxpayer's family).
166. The types of entities to whom a prize winner may assign his award are restricted to those
described in I.R.C. § 170()(1)-(2) (1987) which include:
(I) A State, a possession of the United States, or any political subdivision of any of the
foregoing, or the United States or the District of Columbia ... [and] (2) A corporation,
trust, or community chest, fund, or foundation-
(B) organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or
educational purposes, or to foster-national or international amateur sports competition (but
only if no part of its activities involve the provision of athletic facilities or equipment), or for
the prevention of cruelty to children or animals. ...
167. See Rev. Proc. 87-54, 1987-41 I.R.B. 37 (procedural guidelines for designation of
charitable assignee).
168. Robertson v. United States, 190 F.2d 680, 683 (10th Cir. 1951), aff'd, 343 U.S. 711
(1952).
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chosen to eliminate tax preferences from the Code,16 9 it is worthwhile
to analyze the tax reform process of the mid-1980's and the tax policy
implications of new section 74(b) to see if its emasculation was
justified.
III. ANALYSIS OF POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF NEW
SECTION 74(b)
A. Background for Tax Reform
The federal income tax system initiated in 1913 was based upon a
comprehensive concept of income includable in the taxable base.'
70
The drift to expand preferential treatment to certain kinds of income
began in the 1920's.17 ' For many different and sometimes inconsistent
reasons, various tax benefits, in the form of exclusions, exemptions,
deductions or credits, have been added to the law over time. 172 By the
time of the 1954 codification, the tax laws had grown into a large and
169. A variety of exclusions, exemptions, deductions, and credits has remained in the Code
despite the significant base broadening efforts of Congress in TRA86. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 101(a)
(1987) (amounts received under life insurance contract by reason of death of insured excludable
from gross income); id. § 107 (rental value or rental allowance for parsonage used by minister
excluded from gross income); id. § 163(a), (h) (interest paid by taxpayer on mortgage
indebtedness on primary and one other personal residence generally allowed as a deduction).
170. See supra text accompanying notes 10-14.
171. The very few tax preferences allowed in 1913 and described at supra notes 16-21 were
considerably expanded over the next fifteen years. The Revenue Act of 1928, Pub. L. No. 562,
§ 22(b), 45 Stat. 791, 797-99 (1928) recognized exclusions for: One, life insurance death
proceeds; two, amounts of annuity payments not in excess of taxpayer's investment in the
contract; three, the value of property received by gift, bequest, devise or inheritance; four,
interest received on state or federal obligations; five, amounts received through insurance,
workers' compensation, litigation or settlement as compensation for personal injuries or sickness;
six, amounts received as pensions or similar payments for military service or under a State
employees pension system; seven, the first $300 of interest or dividends received from domestic
building and loan associations; eight, the rental value of a minister's parsonage; nine, earned
income from sources outside of the United States; and ten, the compensation received by teachers
in the territories of Alaska and Hawaii. In addition, section 23 of the 1928 Act allowed as
deductions from income: One, all the ordinary and necessary expenses incurred in carrying on
any trade or business including: a) reasonable compensation for services actually rendered; b)
traveling expenses, meals and lodging costs while away from home in pursuit of business; c)
rental expense for property used in a trade or business; two, all interest paid or accrued on
indebtedness owed by the taxpayer, except for indebtedness used to acquire tax-free United States
government bonds; three, state and local taxes of all sorts; four, losses sustained by taxpayer and
not compensated for by insurance of incurred in a trade or business, in a transaction entered into
for profit, or in a casualty or theft; five, bad debts; six, reasonable allowances for depreciation and
depletion; seven, charitable contributions; eight, dividends received from domestic corporations;
and nine, personal and dependency exemption allowances. Id. § 23, at 790-800.
172. The intricacies and shortcomings of the tax legislative process have been discussed at
length over the past decade. See, e.g., D. DAVIES, UNITED STATES TAXES AND TAX POLICY
285-87 (1986); J. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY ch. 3 (4th ed. 1983); Surrey, The Federal
Tax Legislative Process, 31 REC. OF NYCBA 515 (1976).
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very complicated piece of legislation. The efforts of Congress to fairly
and equitably distribute the tax burden and, at the same time, to pro-
mote economic and social welfare almost inevitably have led to statu-
tory complexity. 73  In addition, modifying the tax code to
accommodate public support for specific activities has often proven
more expedient then appropriating specific expenditures.174 A large
number of special interest groups has been able to persuade Congres-
sional leaders to introduce beneficial provisions in the Code.175 Most
of these were relatively small items when considered separately, but
when taken together they have reduced the tax base significantly.176
Beginning shortly after enactment of the 1954 code, respected com-
mentators on federal income taxation frequently attacked the variety
of preferential provisions in the Code and called upon Congress to
reverse the "erosion of the income tax base" '17 7 caused by these special
provisions. The call for a "comprehensive tax base" has come to be a
central theme in almost all proposals for tax reform.178
173. The problems and reasons for the density and complexity of the federal tax laws are
detailed in J. W=rrE, supra note 27, at 370-73; Gensler, Complexity, Verbosity, and Progressivity,
in EXAMINATION OF BASIC WEAKNESSES OF INCOME AS THE MAJOR FEDERAL TAX BASE
50-71 (R. Lindholm ed. 1986).
174. The "orphan drug" credit is a good example of the use of tax provisions rather than
direct government expenditure. To promote the development and marketing of drugs to be used
for treatment of rare diseases and conditions (so-called "orphan drugs"), Code section 28 allows
a 50% tax credit for qualified clinical testing expenses paid or incurred after 1982. I.R.C. § 28(a)
(1987). This credit was scheduled to expire after 1987, but has been extended by section 232 of
TRA86 to cover amounts paid or incurred through December 31, 1990. I.R.C. § 28(e) (1987).
175. The powerful influence of lobbyists and political action committees ("PAC's") on the tax
legislative process has been described as follows:
The same forces-the concentrated benefits and diffuse costs of tax favoritism-that
produced the existing tax mess would make it difficult to sustain a coherent broad-based
system if one were to be enacted. The same forces that gradually built the existing tower of
confusion, exclusion by exclusion, deduction by deduction, credit by credit, will attempt to
reconstruct a new edifice if the old one is tom down. Persuasive and well-paid advocates
will present the case for just one more special provision for one more worthy cause as
forcefully to Congress after reform as they did before. And each victory for favoritism paves
the way for the next.
The power of special pleading to influence legislation is fueled by the dependency of
elected officials on large campaign contributions by political action groups and individuals.
The promise of campaign money in exchange for votes will not end merely because taxes are
reformed; it will continue as long as congressional and presidential candidates depend on
large campaign contributions.
H. AARON & H. GALPER, ASSESSING TAX REFORM 131-32 (1985).
176. See JOINT COMMITrEE ON TAXATION, 97TH CONG., 1ST SESS., ESTIMATES OF
FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 1983-1988, at 10-18 (Comm. Print 1983).
177. See, eg., Bittker, A "Comprehensive Tax Base" as a Goal of Income Tax Reform, 80
HARV. L. REv. 925 (1967).
178. Numerous governmental studies have advocated the implementation of a
comprehensive tax base as an essential element in any serious tax reform effort. See, e.g., House
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A classic formulation of this tax reform proposal was contained in
the Treasury Department's Blueprints for Basic Tax Reform 1'
released in 1977. The study advocated broadening the tax base by
eliminating or substantially restricting tax reduction provisions. The
augmented tax base would permit a lower basic rate structure with
fewer brackets and lower marginal rates, an increased standard deduc-
tion, and larger personal dependency exemptions. Together, these
measures would have a significant simplifying effect upon the tax law.
Incentives for economic expansion would come from the net tax
reduction resulting from the lowering of rates and from the use of cer-
tain incentives for capital formation and investment which would be
continued. '80
Whatever merit the Blueprints plan and other similar calls for basic
tax reform may have had, they were substantially ignored in the major
tax bills that were enacted through 1984.181 Following President Rea-
gan's first election in 1980, based on a platform of supply-side econom-
ics, modest individual and massive business tax reductions were
enacted in 1981 to stimulate economic recovery. 182 The 1982183 and
198418 tax acts, while paying lipservice to basic principles of equity,
simplification, and efficiency, were primarily concerned with raising
revenue and insuring more widespread compliance with existing tax
laws rather than comprehensive reform.' 85
COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 86TH CONG., 1ST SESS., TAX REVISION COMPENDIUM OF
PAPERS BROADENING THE TAX BASE (Comm. Print 1959); STAFF OF JOINT ECONOMIC COMM.,
89TH CONG., IST SESs., FISCAL POLICY ISSUES OF THE COMING DECADE (Comm. Print 1965);
see also S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO BASIC TAX REFORM (1973).
179. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, BLUE PRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM (1977).
180. Id.
181. See generally D. BRADFORD, UNTANGLING THE INCOME TAX 1-11 (1986); J. WITTE,
supra note 27, chs. 10-11.
182. ERTA, supra note 8, contained a variety of pro-business tax incentives, the most
important of which were the introduction of the accelerated cost recovery system of depreciation,
the sale of tax credits through "safe-harbor" leasing, reductions in tax for oil producers, increases
in the tax credit for research and development, and the extension of investment tax credit for
urban building and rehabilitation. Interesting insights into the operative forces leading to the
passage of the 1981 tax act may be found in the now famous interview of David Stockman who
was then the director of the Office of Management and the Budget. See Greider, The Education
of David Stockman, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Dec. 1981, at 27.
183. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324
(1982).
184. Division A of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494
(1984), is entitled the Tax Reform Act of 1984.
185. Even as Congress stopped short of enacting comprehensive and substantial tax reform in
1984, it did express concern about fundamental problems of the existing tax structure:
The committee believes that the current system of income taxation is unduly complex.
The large number of tax preferences and special deductions, credits and exclusions increase
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While academics had been calling for overall tax reform for many
years, 186 it was not until the 98th Congress (1983-1984)-that any cred-
ible efforts were made to introduce such a measure. During that term
of Congress, members proposed a wide variety of bills aimed at sub-
stantially revamping the federal income tax system.187 Two of the bet-
ter known and more detailed of the congressional proposals were the
Democratic Bradley-Gephardt "Fair Tax Act of 1983 " 188 and the
Republican Kemp-Kasten "Fair and Simple Tax Act of 1984."'' 1
Both bills proposed lowering the tax rates and broadening the tax base
by repealing many tax credits, deductions, exclusions, and other
preferences.
Starting in 1984, the Reagan administration began to consider over-
all tax reform. In his State of the Union address on January 25, 1984,
the President asked then Treasury Secretary Donald T. Regan to
develop a "plan for action to simplify the entire tax code so all taxpay-
ers, big and small, are treated more fairly."' 190 The Treasury study
compliance and administration costs, and undermine the taxpayers' confidence in the
fairness of the Internal Revenue Code. Non-uniform taxation distorts individual and
corporate economic decisions, thereby lowering economic efficiency. For these reasons, it is
desirable to study the effects of a more comprehensive tax base. Broadening the base also
would allow a reduction in marginal rates, which would increase the incentive to work and
invest. The committee believes that alternatives which increase the simplicity, efficiency and
fairness of the tax system should be carefully studied.
S. REP. No. 169, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 931, reprinted in [71 Extra Edition] Stand. Fed. Tax Rep.
(CCH) No. 16, at 931 (Apr. 5, 1984).
186. See, eg., NEW DIRECTIONS IN FEDERAL TAX POLICY FOR THE 1980's (C. Walker & M.
Bloomfield ed. 1983); Warren, Would a Consumption Tax Be Fairer Than an Income Tax, 89
YALE L.J. 1081 (1980); Feldstein, On the Theory of Tax Reform, 6 J. PUB. ECON. 77 (1976);
Bittker, Tax Reform and Tax Simplification, 29 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1 (1974).
187. A summary of the tax reform bills introduced during the 98th Congress appears as an
appendix to the Treasury Department's 1984 Tax Reform Study. See 1 TREASURY REPORT,
supra note 7, at 185-89. Numerous analyses of the various tax reform measures found their way
into print over the next several years. See, eg., A. ANDO, M. BLUME & I. FRIEND, THE
STRUCTURE AND REFORM OF THE U.S. TAX SYSTEM (1985); V. TEPLITZ & S. BROOKS,
ALTERNATIVE TAX PROPOSALS; How THE NUMBERS ADD UP (1986); REAL TAX REFORM-
REPLACING THE INCOME TAX (J. Makin ed. 1985); Report, Bradley-Gephardt and Kemp-Kasten
Bills, 38 TAX LAw. 381 (1985).
188. The Fair Tax Act of 1983, H.R. 3271, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); S. 1421, 98th Cong.,
Ist Sess. (1983).
189. The Fair and Simple Tax Act of 1984, H.R. 6165, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984); S. 2948,
98th Cong. 2d Sess. (1984).
190. N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 1984, at B8, col. 3. President Reagan's statement on tax reform
was:
There's a better way: Let us go forward with an historic reform for fairness, simplicity
and incentives for growth. I am asking Secretary Don Regan for a plan for action to simplify
the entire tax code, so all taxpayers, big and small, are treated more fairly. And I believe
such a plan could result in that "underground economy" being brought into the sunlight of
honest tax compliance; and it could make the tax base broader, so personal tax rates could
291
Washington Law Review
was to be presented to the President after the 1984 presidential
election.
During the 1984 presidential election campaign, tax reform was a
central point of disagreement between the Republican and Democratic
nominees. While both party platforms called for significant tax reform
in general terms,' the public debate concerned whether or not a tax
increase was needed to help reduce the growing federal deficit. For-
mer Vice President Mondale insisted a tax increase was necessary,
even inevitable, while President Reagan held steadfast in his opposi-
tion to raising taxes.192
Following President Reagan's landslide reelection,' 93 the Treasury
Department in November 1984 presented the tax reform recommen-
dations which had previously been requested by the President. 94 The
report set forth a variety of recommendations for reform of the
existing tax system and a comparison of its recommendations to
existing law and many of the leading congressional tax reform propos-
als. The initial Treasury report aroused a great deal of controversy
among business, civic, and other special interest groups. Much of that
public commentary was taken into account by the Treasury Depart-
ment which, under the leadership of a new Secretary of the Treasury,
helped the Reagan administration refine its proposals for tax reform.
On May 29, 1985, President Reagan sent Congress an extensive set
of tax reform proposals.' 95 The proposals were transmitted with a
brief message from President Reagan which challenged the Congress
"to change our present tax system into a model of fairness, simplicity,
efficiency and compassion, to remove the obstacles to growth and
unlock the door to a future of unparalleled innovation and achieve-
ment."' 96 The President emphasized that the "present tax code is not
come down, not go up. I have asked that specific recommendations, consistent with these
objectives, be presented to me by December 1984.
Id.
191. See Tax Plank from Democrats' Platform, TAX NOTES, July 23, 1984, at 331-32;
Timberlake, GOP Platform Eliminates Reagan's 'Last Resort,- Says No to Tax Increases, TAX
NOTES, Aug. 20, 1984, at 718-19.
192. See the text of the Presidential election debate held on October 7, 1984 in N.Y. Times,
Oct. 8, 1984, at B4-B6.
193. N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1984, at Al.
194. 1 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 7; 2 TREASURY DEP'T REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT,
GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT PROPOSAL (1984), reprinted in
[Bulletin 52, Sec. 3] Fed. Taxes (P-H) 159,476 (Dec. 6, 1984) [hereinafter 2 TREASURY REPORT];
3 TREASURY DEP'T REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY,
AND ECONOMIC GROWTH (1984), reprinted in [Bulletin 3, Sec. 3] Fed. Taxes (P-H) 59,511
(Dec. 27, 1984).
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only unfair, it slows economic growth and job creation, and hinders
technological advancement by interfering with free markets and
diverting productive investment into tax shelters and tax avoidance
schemes." 19 7
The proposal summarized the problems of the existing tax system:
It was unfair, too complicated, and it needlessly impeded economic
growth.198 In the most general of terms, the report proposed reducing
tax rates and lowering the number of tax brackets of individuals to
only three, increasing the amount of the personal and dependency
exemptions and the zero bracket amount, and comprehensive base
broadening measures through the elimination or curtailment of a wide
range of categories of preferential tax treatment.1 99 "Only a limited
number of special deductions and exclusions would be retained-prin-
cipally those that are widely used, and generally judged to be central to
American values."2"
After holding extensive hearings and considering various alterna-
tives during the summer and fall of 1985, the House Committee on
Ways and Means on December 3, 1985, reported out its tax reform
bill.2"1 The House bill bore great similarity in general form to the
President's proposal, although there were numerous differences in
detail. After passage by the House of Representatives on December
17, 1985,202 the measure went to the Senate Finance Committee for its
consideration. The Senate Finance Committee's amended version of
H.R. 3838 (now called "Tax Reform Act of 1986") was passed by the
Senate on June 24, 1986.203
A Committee of Conference between the House and Senate was
appointed to reconcile the differences between the two versions of the
bill. The Conference Committee reached an agreement in principle on
August 29, 1986,2 4 and reported out its version of H.R. 3838 on Sep-
tember 18, 1986.205 The Conference Committee's proposal for tax
reform was passed by the House and Senate on September 25 and 27,
197. Id.
198. Id. at 1-2.
199. Id. at 3-8.
200. Id. at 4 (emphasis in original).
201. H.R. 3838, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. H-10,559 (1985) (Tax Reform Act of
1985).
202. N.Y. Times, Dec. 18, 1985, at Al, col. 5.
203. N.Y. Times, June 25, 1986, at Al, col. 5.
204. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 99TH CONG., 2d Sess., Summary of Conference
Agreement on H.R. 3838, Doc. No. 86-5837, at 15 (Comm. Print 1986) (Tax Reform Act of
1986).
205. TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, H.R. CONF. No. 841, TO ACCOMPANY H.R. 3838, 99TH
CONG., 2D SESS. (Comm. Print 1986) [hereinafter CONFERENCE REPORT].
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1986, respectively.20 6 Finally, on October 22, 1986, after almost four
continuous years of study and effort, President Reagan signed into law
the most far-reaching revision of the federal income tax system since
the passage of the 1954 Code.207 The changes wrought by the Tax
Reform Act of 1986 were so substantial that the tax code is hereafter
to be cited as the "Internal Revenue Code of 1986.20
B. Reasons Offered for Changing Section 74(b)
None of the tax reform measures introduced during the 98th Con-
gress had specifically addressed the exclusion provided for public
achievement prizes and awards in section 74(b).21 9 The first specific
suggestion that the exclusion be modified appears in the November 27,
1984, Treasury report on tax simplification and reform.t 0 Among the
many base broadening measures enumerated therein was the proposal
to disallow the exclusion, even for the traditionally excludable notable
achievement prizes and awards such as the Nobel prize, unless the
individual recipient designated that the prize or award go to a tax
exempt charitable organization. 2 11 The reasons offered by Treasury to
justify the change were as follows:
Prizes or awards increase an individual's ability to pay tax the same as
any other receipt that increases an individual's economic wealth. In
effect, the failure to tax all prizes and awards creates a program of
matching grants under which certain prizes or awards also bestow the
government-funded benefit of tax relief. Basing this program in the tax
code permits it to escape public and legislative scrutiny and causes bene-
fits to be distributed not according to merit but to the amount of tax the
individual would otherwise owe.
Repeal of the exclusion for certain prizes and awards will affect the
tax liability of only a few taxpayers, but it will reduce the complexity of
the tax laws and preclude attempts to characterize income as a tax-
exempt award.2t2
206. N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 1986, at A1, col. 6; N.Y. Times, Sept. 28, 1986, § 1, at 1, col. 4.
207. N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1986, at Dl, col. 6.
208. TRA86, supra note 3, § 2(a).
209. A number of those proposals did, however, purport to eliminate almost all exclusions
and deductions in an effort to simply define a comprehensive income tax base which would be
subjected to a low flat rate of tax. See, e.g., H.R. 5711, 98th Cong.. 2d Sess. (1984): S. 557. 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) (introduced in the House by Richard C. Shelby (Democrat-Ala.) and in
the Senate by Dennis DeConcini (Democrat-Az.)).




Taxation of Prizes and Awards
The President's May 29, 1985, proposals to the Congress for tax
reform21 3 contain a nearly identical explanation.214
A somewhat expanded explanation of the proposal to amend section
74(b) is found in the House Ways and Means Committee Report on
H.R. 383815 and the subsequent Senate Finance Committee
Report.21 6 In addition to the factors identified in the Treasury's and
President's reports, the congressional reports added the following
explanation of the change:
The questions of what constitutes a qualifying form of achievement,
whether an individual took action to enter a contest or proceeding, and'
whether or not the conditions of receiving a prize or award involve ren-
dering "substantial" services, have all caused some difficulty in this
regard. Finally, the present-law exclusion may in some circumstances
serve as a possible vehicle for the payment of disguised compensation.
At the same time, the committee recognizes that in some instances an
award recipient may wish to assign the award to charity, rather than
claiming it for personal use. Accordingly, the bill provides that a prize
or award meeting the present-law exclusion requirements under section
74(b) is excludable from gross income if the prize or award is transferred
by the payor, pursuant to a designation made by the winner of the prize
or award, to a governmental unit or to a tax-exempt charitable organiza-
tion contributions to which are deductible under section 170(c)(1) or
section 170(c)(2), respectively.
... In such case, the prize or award is not included in the winner's'
gross income, and no charitable deduction is allowed to the winner or to
the payor.
For purposes of determining whether a prize or award that is so desig-
nated qualified as excludable under the bill, the present-law rules con-
cerning the scope of section 74(b) are retained without change. In order
to qualify for the exclusion, the designation must be made by the tax-
payer, and carried out by the party making the award, before the tax-
payer uses the item that is awarded (e.g., in the case of an award of
money, before the taxpayer spends, deposits, or otherwise invests the
money). Disqualifying uses by the taxpayer include use of the property
213. PRESIDENT'S PROPOSALS, supra note 7.
214. Id.; GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TRA86, supra note 6, at 59.
215. H.R. REP. No. 426, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 103-07 (1986), reprinted in vol. 2 1986-3 C.B.
103-07.
216. 1986 S. REP., supra note 165, at 47-54.
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with the permission of the taxpayer or by one associated with the tax-
payer (e.g., a member of the taxpayer's family). 2 17
On the basis of these reports,218 Congress amended section 74(b) by
adding new subsection (b)(3) which contains the additional require-
ment for exclusion that the prize or award must be assigned to charity.
C. Critique of Legislative Rationale
The reasons offered by Congress and the Reagan administration for
the amendment of section 74(b) may be summarily listed as follows:
One, the exclusion found therein was an unnecessary source of com-
plexity in the Code; two, problems had arisen in the past in applying
the tri-partite test of excludability; three, only a few taxpayers utilized
the tax benefit it conferred; four, there was a possibility that the exclu-
sion could have been used to disguise compensation as a tax exempt
award; five, valuable prizes or awards were economic income that
should have been taxed like any other form of income; and, six, the
exclusion constituted a tax expenditure no longer justified in the con-
text of comprehensive tax reform.
By analyzing each one of these proffered reasons carefully, it may be
seen that they simply do not justify the change that was made to the
statute.
1. Undue Complexity
There is some surface appeal to the notion that section 74(b) as
enacted in the 1954 Code added undue complexity to the tax laws. The
presence of the exclusion, like that of all of the other exclusions and
tax preferential provisions, results in a more complicated statute than
one in which all forms of income would be comprehensively included
in the tax base and no preferences of any sort would exist. Conceding
that point, however, does not necessarily validate this rationale as a
justification for the Tax Reform Act of 1986 amendment to section
74(b). For one thing, the new code, in toto, is not significantly less
complex than its predecessor. Even more importantly, section 74(b),
as amended, is more complicated after the reformation than before. A
subsection with four specific requirements for exclusion is just not as
simple as one with only three requirements. For purposes of deter-
217. H.R. REP. No. 426, supra note 215, at 104-06; accord 1986 S. REP., supra note 165, at
48-50.
218. The Conference Committee report conformed to the earlier House and Senate
Committee reports with respect to the change in the treatment of prizes and awards. See
CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 205, at 11-17 to 19..
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mining whether a future prize or award transferred to charity will
qualify for the new section 74(b) exclusion, all of the old ostensibly
complicated rules governing the scope of the section have been
retained. Complexity must not have created great concern!
2. Past Problems in Applying Section 74(b)
As was noted previously,219 the early case law interpreting section
74(b) produced generally predictable results which were consistent
with its legislative purposes. The specific areas of achievement deline-
ated in the Code were construed as exhaustive and were applied nar-
rowly. For more than thirty years, the exclusion was limited to prizes
and awards for significant public achievement. Only in the area of
employer awards to employees had a problem recently developed, as
220illustrated by the Jones case. It seems rather disingenuous for the
House and Senate reports to suggest that difficulty had arisen in the
past in applying all of the requirements of section 74(b). 221
3. Limited Number of Taxpayers Affected
The Treasury Department report correctly observes that only a few
taxpayers would be affected by changing section 74(b).222  They
would, of course, be the recipients of unsolicited prizes and awards
recognizing past achievement in one of the enumerated fields of public
contribution who were not required to perform substantial future serv-
ices as a condition of receipt. Acknowledging the limited availability
of the exclusion does not, however, necessitate its vitiation. This is
true even where an express goal of the tax reform effort is to retain
only a limited number of special deductions and exclusions.223 The
relatively small number of taxpayers who might have been qualified to
use the section 74(b) exclusion means that very little revenue could be
gained by adding these prizes and awards to the tax base.224 That
219. See supra text accompanying notes 85-162.
220. See supra text accompanying notes 143-62.
221. See supra text accompanying note 217.
222. 2 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 194, at 60, provides: "Repeal of the exclusion for
certain prizes and awards will affect the tax liability of only a few taxpayers, but it will reduce the
complexity of the tax laws and preclude attempts to characterize income as a tax exempt award."
223. See supra text accompanying note 200.
224. The Treasury Report and President's Proposals estimated the change in federal tax
receipts occasioned by the amendment to Code section 74(b) to be negligible for the five fiscal
years following the passage of the Tax Reform Act. See 1 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 7,
Appendix B, at 245; PRESIDENT'S PROPOSALS, supra note 7, Appendix C, at 453. The House,
Senate, and Conference Committee estimates of revenue impact combined the effect of the
change in section 74(b) with the changes made in the area of employee achievement awards. See
supra note 95. When so combined, the estimate of revenue impact shows a revenue loss. See,
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being the case, the question should not be how few taxpayers utilize
the exclusion, but rather whether the endeavors it seeks to encourage
are "central to American values. 2
2 5
4. Disguised Compensation
The Jones case clearly was a motivating force behind the change in
section 74. Even though the various administration and congressional
reports only make a single footnote reference to the Jones case,226 they
all allude to the circumstances under which the exclusion could serve
as a possible vehicle for disguised compensation.227 Until 1984, the
case law consistently followed the underlying rationale of section 74
and the "bright-line" test of the Regulations and held employer
awards to employees for all employment related achievements to be
taxable. The likelihood of disguised compensation escaping taxation
through section 74(b) was insignificant. The Jones case opened the
door for possible abuse. Congress, however, could have closed the
door without denying deserving award recipients tax exclusion. Had
it so chosen, Congress could have simply and directly denied the
exclusion to any award from an employer to an employee under any
circumstances.228
5. Prizes as Economic Income
No one can dispute the observation in the House and Senate reports
that "the receipt of an award for scientific or artistic achievement in
e.g., CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 205, Table A-2, at 11-866. That projection seems suspect
for several reasons. The elimination of the exclusion for prizes like the Nobel Prize will produce a
revenue gain, albeit a small one. The changes made in the area of employer awards to employees
for length of service or safety achievement were aimed at curbing abuses, did not create any new
tax preference, and, in fact, removed one previous category of excludable award (i.e., employee
productivity). It is quite likely that this change will also produce a small revenue gain.
225. See supra text accompanying note 200.
226. H.R. REP. No. 426, supra note 215, at 103 n.3; accord 1986 S. REP., supra note 165, at
47 n.3, which provides:
(3) Treas. Reg. sec. 1.74-1(b). But see Jones v. Comm'r, 743 F.2d 1429 (9th Cir. 1984),
holding that an award from an employer to an employee can qualify for the present-law
section 74(b) exclusion under extraordinary circumstances. The court held that the
exclusion applied in the case of a prominent scientist who was rewarded by the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) for lifetime scientific achievement, only
part of which was accomplished while the scientist was employed by NASA. No inference
is intended as to whether the decision of this case is correct under present law.
Similar language appears as a footnote in the GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TRA86 issued May 4,
1987 by the Joint Committee on Taxation. See GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TRA86, supra note
6, at 30 n.12.
227. See supra text accompanying note 217.
228. See infra text accompanying notes 284-92.
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the amount of $10,000 increases the recipient's net worth and ability
to pay taxes to the same extent as the receipt of $10,000 in wages,
dividends, or prizes and awards that are taxable under current law." '229
That conclusion was true for the more than seventy years prior to the
enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1986. Perhaps the argument that
public achievement prizes should be taxed the same as all other forms
of economic income would be more persuasive if Congress had, in fact,
fashioned a completely comprehensive tax base in the 1986 legislation.
Instead, Congress continued many existing tax preferences2 30 and cre-
ated some additional ones. 31  That being the case, the economic
income rationale begs the fundamental tax policy question of whether
the exclusion's tax benefit is still justified.
6. Exclusion as Tax Expenditure
It is not entirely clear from the portions of the Treasury and Presi-
dent's reports which address the central tax policy issue whether they
constitute an indictment of this particular tax incentive or the entire
system of tax expenditures sprinkled throughout the Code.232 The tax
expenditure argument is premised on the concerns that the tax benefits
may receive less public and legislative scrutiny than directly appropri-
ated expenditures; that they distort choices of the marketplace; that
they permit windfalls by paying taxpayers for what they would do
anyway; and that, because of the progressive rate structure of the
income tax, they may be worth more to the high income taxpayer than
229. H.R. REP. No. 426, supra note 215, at 104; accord 1986 S. REP., supra note 165, at 48.
230. See, eg., I.R.C. § 101 (1987) (certain life insurance proceeds and other death benefits);
id. § 103 (interest on qualified state and local bonds, although TRA86 substantially restricted
qualification); id. § 117 (amounts received as qualified scholarship, also substantially restricted
qualification); id. § 121 (one-time exclusion of up to $125,000 of gain from sale of principal
residence by individuals aged 55 or older); id. § 127 (amounts paid by employer for employee's
education under a nondiscriminatory educational assistance plan); id. § 132 (qualifying employee
fringe benefits).
231. See, eg., I.R.C. § 108(g) (1987) (discharge of indebtedness income realized by certain
farmers whose farm loans are reduced in loan work-out agreements with their lenders may be
excluded subject to making basis adjustment under I.R.C. § 1017); id. § 131 (amounts received
by foster care providers providing care to adults placed with them by the appropriate
governmental agency); id. § 162(m) (self-employed persons allowed to deduct a portion of the
cost of health insurance for themselves, their spouses, and dependents).
232. See 2 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 194, at 60; PRESIDENT'S PROPOSALS, supra note 7,
at 59:
In effect, the failure to tax all prizes and awards creates a program of matching grants under
which certain prizes or awards also bestow the government-funded benefit of tax relief.
Basing this program in the tax code permits it to escape public and legislative scrutiny and
causes benefits to be distributed not according to merit but to the amount of tax the
individual would otherwise owe.
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the person of modest income. All of these features have been
examined in great depth in the now extensive body of scholarly litera-
ture on tax expenditures. 23 3 Without seeking to refuel the fires of that
debate, it may safely be said that tax expenditures still abound
throughout the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 and that the staffs of
the Joint Committee on Taxation, Treasury Department, and the
Office of Management and Budget all seem to have the ability to
attach estimates of revenue gains and losses to specific provisions of
the law.23" Furthermore, the reduction in the tax rates in the Act and
the compression of the bracket structure from as many as fifteen to
two or three tax brackets, depending on how one counts,235 substan-
tially undercut the argument that the tax benefit conferred by the
exclusion would be distortively distributed. 36
D. Tax Policy and Economic Efficiency
The reasons offered in the legislative history do not answer the fun-
damental tax policy question of why after more than seven decades
Congress would see fit to render impotent a settled policy of using tax
incentives to encourage gifted persons to use their talents in ways that
would benefit society as a whole. Outstanding individual achieve-
ments in the fields of religion, charity, science, education, art, litera-
233. Much has been written about the tax expenditure concept. A description of the
development of the initial Treasury analysis may be found in S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX
REFORM (1973); see also S. SURREY & P. McDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES (1985); Surrey &
McDaniel, The Tax Expenditure Concept: Current Developments and Emerging Issues, 20 B.C.L.
REV. 225 (1979); Bittker, Accounting for Federal "Tax Subsidies" in the National Budget, 22
NAT'L TAX J. 244 (1969); McIntyre, A Solution to the Problem of Defining a Tax Expenditure.
14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 79 (1980).
234. See, e.g., GENERAL EXPLANATION TRA86, supra note 6, at 1353-79; see also S.
SURREY & P. MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES 202 (1985) providing: "[The] current exclusion
for certain prizes and awards is itself a tax expenditure (presumably it has not been shown on tax
expenditure lists because of the small amount of revenue involved)."
235. Beginning in 1988, the rate structure will provide for two tax rate brackets-15% and
28%. However, the benefit of the 15% bracket will be phased out for taxpayers having taxable
income exceeding certain specified levels. As a result of the phaseout, some taxpayers will face a
33% tax rate on some of their income. A five bracket transitional rate structure will apply for
the year 1987. See GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TRA86, supra note 6, at 20-21.
236. The tax expenditure argument has traditionally criticized the "upside-down" effect of
tax preferences taking the form of exclusions or deductions. That is to say, an exclusion or
deduction of a fixed amount will produce a larger tax savings for the high income-high tax
bracket individual than for an individual with low or moderate income. Prior to passage of
TRA86, the lowest rate of tax on taxable income above the zero bracket amount was I I% and
the highest rate was 50%. The difference in the value of the same tax preference item between
high and low bracket taxpayers was substantial. Now, with the spread of tax rates ranging only
from 15% to 28%, there is less disparity between the worth of the same tax preference item
between high and low bracket individuals.
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ture, and civic affairs have the potential to endow mankind with
significant value,237 even if not susceptible to exact measurement in
monetary or economic terms. Recognizing, as the Treasury's and Pres-
ident's reports do,238 that excluding public achievement prizes and
awards from taxation bestows a government-funded tax benefit in
addition to the award itself does not at all explain or justify the termi-
nation of that benefit.
The explanation for this change must be found elsewhere. It is the
opinion of this author that the overriding concern of the President and
the Congress for increased economic productivity and competitiveness
in world markets239 has unduly influenced their judgment on this par-
ticular tax policy issue. The perceived need to foster economic effi-
237. During the mid-1970's, the Treasury Department supported a study on private
philanthropy and public needs through a Commission chaired by John H. Filer. Among the
research papers sponsored by the Commission was a study that attempted to identify and define
public and private values and needs in contemporary American society. The list of basic public
needs recognized by that paper included: health; economic well-being; justice, security, and
freedom; education; science; religion, philosophy, and idealism; peace and social integration;
"culture" and entertainment; recreation/relaxation; emotional expression; participation;
ecological balance; social welfare; social change; and, international perspective. While more
extensive than the areas of endeavor addressed by section 74(b), there are obvious areas of
congruity. For example, the paper defined religion, philosophy, and idealism as:
The need for religion in the broadest sense reflects a concern for the ultimate value and
meaning of human existence in the universe. This need must be interpreted broadly to
include not only worship, religious education and missionary work of the traditional
theologies and religions, but also the newer and sometimes secular philosophies, idealogies,
moralities, and world views. Whether old or new, these idealogies all speak to the human
condition and to the problems of what is good, right, valuable, and worth doing. In this
sense they all represent different approaches to idealism as it applies to human behavior and
human ends. As such, they all reflect in some way a concern for altruism and the public
interest.
Smith, Values, Voluntary Action and Philanthropy: The Appropriate Relationship of Private Phi-
lanthropy to Public Needs, in 2 RESEARCH PAPERS SPONSORED BY THE COMMISSION ON PRI-
VATE PHILANTHROPY AND PUBLIC NEEDS 1098-99 (1977).
238. See 2 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 194, at 60; PRESIDENT'S PROPOSALS, supra note 7,
at 59.
239. The President's Proposals criticized the pre-TRA86 tax system as follows:
(3) The current system needlessly impedes growth.
-By encouraging investment for purposes of tax reduction rather than for independently
worthy economic purposes, it prevents the market from allocating resources as efficiently
and productively as it might.
-By taxing workers' earnings at excessive rates--or by being perceived as taxing unfairly-
it discourages work, saving, productivity, innovation, and growth.
-Thus, it prevents workers and the economy from reaching their full potential.
PRESIDENT'S PROPOSALS, supra note 7, at 2. This concern for economic efficiency is also
reflected in the GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TRA86, supra note 6, at 9-10.
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ciency and growth infuses all of the administrative and congressional
tax reform reports with an eerie green glow. 2 40
The present concern for economic efficiency is not limited to discus-
sions of tax reform and tax policy. According to the adherents of the
economic analysis of law,24' the theories and empirical methods of the
social science of economics may be applied across the board to the
legal system. Particular laws and legal institutions are now to be eval-
uated on the basis of whether they are economically efficient. The eco-
nomic analysis suggests that law, to be valid, must effect an allocation
of economic resources in such a way that societal wealth is maxi-
mized.24' This economic theory is, of course, related to the popular
moral theory of utilitarianism, which holds that actions and institu-
tions must be judged in relation to their contribution to the general
welfare or happiness. Traditional utilitarian theory as espoused by
Jeremy Bentham243 and John Stuart Mill 2 required that one act so as
to promote the greatest happiness, or utility, for the greatest
number.245 When the interests of different members of society come
into conflict, this philosophy suggests that we should serve the greater
aggregate interest, taking into account all the benefits and burdens
that might result from the available alternative choices.2 46
240. The unbridled economic drive of the fictitious pool-hustler Eddie Felson has been
chronicled in two motion pictures starring Paul Newman, The Hustler (Twentieth Century Fox
1961) and The Color of Money (Touchstone Pictures 1986). Mr. Newman's performance earned
him the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences Award for Best Actor in a leading role
during 1986. Presumably, future Oscar winners will have to include the fair market value of the
statuette in gross income.
241. Two of the seminal works exploring the relationships between law and economics are:
Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961);
Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960); see also G. BECKER, THE
ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (2d ed. 1971); W. HIRSCH, LAW AND ECONOMICS (1979); R.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2d ed. 1977); R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE
(1981); Brown, Toward an Economic Theory of Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 323 (1973); Posner,
Some Uses and Abuses of Economics in Law, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 281 (1979).
242. See R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 60-76 (1981).
243. Philosopher Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) received a legal education and was admitted
to practice law in 1769. Bentham, however, wrote about law as it ought to be rather than actually
practicing law as it was. His most well known work, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals
and Legislation, was initially published in 1789. See generally J. STEINTRAGER, BENTHAM
11-18 (1977).
244. John Stuart Mill (1806-1873), British diplomat, politician, and political philospher of
the nineteenth century, published On Liberty (1859) and Utilitarianism (1863). See generally
THE GREAT LEGAL PHILOSOPHERS 364-65 (C. Morris ed. 1959).
245. Id. at 367.
246. Bentham's articulation of the utilitarian calculus is as follows:
By the principle of utility is meant that principle which approves or disapproves of every
action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to have to augment or
diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question: or, what is the same thing
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This assumes that the relevant effects of the different choices on spe-
cific individuals can be compared quantitatively. In the area of moral
decision making, it may very well be impossible to make such "inter-
personal comparisons of utility." '247 Therefore, the economic philoso-
phers tell us to stop worrying about the promotion of societal
happiness, something we cannot measure, and, instead, urge us to act
as if we had a duty to maximize societal wealth, something that is
susceptible to econometric calculation.248
The leading spokesman for economic jurisprudence is Judge Rich-
ard A. Posner. Judge Posner has addressed the subject of tax prefer-
ences in general and the pre-1987 section 74(b) exclusion for prizes
and awards in particular:
The exclusion of any real [income] from taxable income reduces the
tax base, creates incentives to substitute activities that yield the excluded
form of income, and may, depending on the wealth of those who receive
the excluded form of income, increase inequality. The broadest defini-
tion of income would be all pecuniary and nonpecuniary receipts,
including not only leisure and (other) nonpecuniary income from house-
hold production but also gifts, bequests, and prizes....
The present tax law distinguishes between prizes won in a contest
(which are taxable) and other prizes (such as the Nobel Prize), which
are not. The distinction is unsound. To fail to tax prizes in contests
would induce people to substitute the entering of contests for other
forms of productive activity. But not taxing Nobel Prize winnings and
other honors has a similar effect. The existence of these prizes affects
research and other decisions by people in eligible occupations and even
the choice of occupations. 249
in other words, to promote or to oppose that happiness. I say of every action whatsoever;
and therefore not only of every action of a private individual, but of every measure of
government.
By utility is meant that property in any object, whereby it tends to produce benefit,
advantage, pleasure, good, or happiness, (all this in the present case comes to the same
thing) or (what comes again to the same thing) to prevent the happening of mischief, pain,
evil, or unhappiness to the party whose interest is considered: if that party be the community
in general, thenthe happiness of the community: if a particular individual, then the
happiness of that individual.
J. BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 11-12 (J.
Burns & H.L.A. Hart ed. 1970).
247. See generally D. LYONS, ETHICS AND THE RULE OF LAW 111-12 (1984) (distinguishing
utilitarianism from prudence-the principle by which an individual evaluates actions or decisions
in relation to personal welfare).
248. See generally R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 48-87 (1981) (discussing
utilitarianism, economics, and social theory).
249. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 463-64 (3d ed. 1986) (citations omitted).
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Talented individuals who ignore available paths to immediate com-
mercial or economic reward and instead seek to contribute to man-
kind's store of knowledge or to lift up the human condition through
art, literature, education, charitable work, or the like are being told
they made the wrong choice. Or, at least, they are being told that
society will not endorse their choice to pursue publicly-oriented
endeavors by allowing them to receive any prizes or awards for their
activities free of tax. The message of this myopic tax policy is that
potential poets should be writing advertising jingles on Madison Ave-
nue, potential research chemists should give up the university labora-
tory and seek employment at Du Pont, and perhaps even that future
Elie Wiesel's25° should go into investment banking on Wall Street.
Posner's criticism of the exclusion which previously was available
under section 74(b) is consistent with his view that law, including tax
law, ought to simulate a free market economy and encourage individu-
als to order their affairs so as to maximize societal wealth. The ques-
tion of whether people should necessarily accept and follow market
simulating rules as the foundation for law has recently been addressed
by legal and political philosophers who disagree with the proponents
of the economic analysis of law."'1 If Judge Posner is correct, then the
only legitimate concerns of the tax laws would be to raise the minimal
amount of revenue necessary to operate the essential functions of gov-
ernment and to encourage economic objectives that maximize societal
wealth.
250. Elie Wiesel, who survived the Nazi Holocaust to become a voice of its victims and a
champion of dignity for all people, was named the winner of the 1986 Nobel Peace Prize on
October 14, 1986. Now age 58, Mr. Wiesel has written 25 books on the Nazi extermination of
European Jewry. His first work, Night, published in 1958, described his experiences in the
Auschwitz and Buchenwald Concentration camps where his mother, father and sister died.
Through his writing and public activities, Mr. Wiesel has provided eloquent testimony to the
horror of past events and an indictment of contemporary violations of human rights, including
the plight of Soviet Jews. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 1986, at Al, col. 2.
251. Professor Ronald Dworkin refutes the wealth maximizing views of the economic
jurisprudents as follows:
History provides no useful evidence for this supposition. It does not confirm that the best
way to make a community happier on average is to make it richer on the whole with no
direct constraints of distribution; that thesis remains an article of faith more popular among
the rich than the poor. No doubt people on average have better lives, at least according to
conventional views of what makes a life better, in prosperous nations than in very poor ones.
But the present question is different. Do we have any reason to think that average happiness
is generally improved in prosperous nations by still more prosperity, measured by the sums
its citizens are collectively willing and able to pay for the goods they make and trade? Or
that happiness could not be improved even more if citizens accepted other standards of
personal responsibility, standards that sometimes ignored prosperity for other values? I
think not; these claims may be true, but we have no persuasive evidence that they are.
R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 289-90 (1986).
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E. Tax Policy and Social Objectives
The use of the tax system has never been limited to simply address-
ing economic objectives. Scores of tax provisions have found their
way into the Code to encourage or discourage particular kinds of
social behavior.252 The clearest example of this is the section 170
deduction for charitable contributions. 253 This incentive was added to
the tax laws in 1917 to encourage private philanthropic support for
organizations which were dedicated to addressing broad public needs
such as religion, charity, science, education, literature, and the arts. 254
(This theme has a certain familiar ring to it, does it not?) While this
kind of tax preference has been criticized using traditional tax expen-
diture arguments,255 it has generally been defended on grounds of plu-
ralism and anti-bureaucraticism. That is to say, the tax incentive
promotes private decision making about what kinds of charitable work
ought to be done without undue interference from a behemoth govern-
ment bound in red tape. 6
One might ask why the section 170 deduction for charitable contri-
butions of money or property was spared in recent tax reform efforts
to arrive at a more comprehensive tax base. Aside from the fact that
252. Taxes imposed upon the consumption of alcohol and tobacco do raise significant
amounts of revenue. However, the taxes have frequently been supported for the reason that they
discourage people from ingesting potentially harmful substances. Commenting on this subject,
Professor Lon Fuller wrote:
Tax laws are not just like other laws. For one thing, they enter more directly into the
planning of one's affairs. Moreover-and much more importantly-their principal object is
often not merely to raise revenue, but to shape human conduct in ways thought desirable by
the legislator.... What shall we say of the tax on alcoholic beverages? Was its purpose to
discourage drinking or was it to raise revenue by imposing a special levy on those whose
habits of life indicate that they are especially able to help defray the costs of government?
There can be no clear answers to questions like these.
L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 60-61 (rev. ed. 1969).
253. I.R.C. § 170(a)(1) (1987) provides: "General rule.-There shall be allowed as a
deduction any charitable contribution (as defined in subsection (c)) payment of which is made
within the taxable year. A charitable contribution shall be allowable as a deduction only if
verified under regulations prescribed by the Secretary." See also I.R.C. § 170(b) (1987)
(limitations on the amount of charitable contribution deduction taxpayer may claim); id.
§ 67(b)(4) (contribution deduction limited to taxpayers who itemize).
254. Revenue Act of 1917, ch. 63, § 1201(2), 40 Stat. 300, 330 (1917) (deduction limited to
15% of donor's taxable income); see I.R.C. § 170(c)(l)-(2) (1987) (statutory descriptions of
organizations which may be the recipient of tax-deductible charitable contribution).
255. See Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. L. REV. 309,
344-56 (1972); Rabin, Charitable Trusts and Charitable Deductions, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 912
(1966); Taggart, The Charitable Deduction, 26 TAX L. REV. 63 (1970); Taussig, Economic
Aspects of the Personal Income Tax Treatment of Charitable Contributions, 20 NAT'L TAX J. 1
(1967).
256. See Bittker, Charitable Contributions: Tax Deductions or Matching Grants?, 28 TAX L.
REv. 37 (1972).
Washington Law Review Vol. 63:257, 1988
publicly supported charities lobby very effectively,25 7 there is a sub-
stantial body of theoretical and empirical literature documenting the
effectiveness of the deduction in promoting contributions, particularly
among the wealthy. 8
Interestingly, the deduction under section 170 has never been
allowed for the value of services volunteered to a qualified charity,
only for money or property contributed. While the language of the
statute does not restrict the deduction to contributions which take the
form of the transfer of property or money, 59 the administrative and
judicial interpretations for more than sixty years have done so. 260 The
primary reason for this restriction appears to be the tax administration
problems involved in verifying and measuring the value of volunteer
257. Notwithstanding the fact that I.R.C. §§ 170(c)(2)(D), 501 (c)(3) (1987) contain
substantial restrictions on the ability of qualified charities to engage in attempts to influence
legislation or to participate in political campaigns on behalf of any candidate for public office,
certain limited lobbying and "grass roots" expenditures are permitted under I.R.C. § 170(h)
(1987). Needless to say, supporters of public charities have been very effective in making their
views on proposed tax legislation known to members of Congress.
258. See, e.g., G. BRANNON, THE EFFECT OF TAX DEDUCTIBILITY ON THE LEVEL OF
CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS AND VARIATIONS ON THE THEME (1974); Sunley, Dimensions of
Charitable Giving Reported on Federal Estate, Gift, and Fiduciary Tax Returns, in 4 RESEARCH
PAPERS SPONSORED BY THE COMMISSION ON PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY AND PUBLIC NEEDS
2319 (1977); McDaniel, Study of Federal Matching Grants for Charitable Contributions, in 4
RESEARCH PAPERS SPONSORED BY THE COMMISSION ON PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY AND
PUBLIC NEEDS 2417 (1977).
259. See I.R.C. § 170(a)(1) (1987); id. § 170(c) (defining "charitable contribution" as "a
contribution or gift to or for the use of" any one of a number of qualified governmental or
charitable entities described in sections 170(c)(1) and (2)) (emphasis added).
260. Since 1920, the Treasury Department and the courts have consistently disallowed
deductions for the value of services rendered to a charity. See O.D. 712, 3 C.B. 188 (1920); Rev.
Rul. 57-462, 1957-2 C.B. 157 (donation of newspaper space held equivalent to a service and thus
not deductible); Rev. Rul. 162, 1953-2 C.B. 127 (donation of blood is a service and, therefore,
nondeductible); Korda v. Commissioner, 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 888 (1971) (research work in
connection with trade relations between United States and Hungary amounted to a
nondeductible service). Also, the Treasury Regulations provide:
(g) Contributions of services. No deduction is allowable under section 170 for a
contribution of services. However, unreimbursed expenditures made incident to the
rendition of services to an organization contributions to which are deductible may constitute
a deductible contribution. For example, the cost of a uniform without general utility which
is required to be worn in performing donated services is deductible. Similarly, out-of-pocket
transportation expenses necessarily incurred in performing donated services are deductible.
Reasonable expenditures for meals and lodging necessarily incurred while away from home
in the course of performing donated services also are deductible.
Treas. Reg. § I-170A-l(g) (1972). The above cited references seem to suggest that it is relatively
easy to distinguish between contributions of property and services. This has not always been the
case. See, e.g., Goss v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 594 (1973) (essays prepared by economist and
donated to qualified charity were held to be property, rather than services, and deduction in
amount of $500 permitted).
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service donations.26' In addition, the disparity in the value of personal
services among taxpayers, as well as the questions of whether or not
the donor has actually parted with anything when he donates his per-
sonal services, provide more foundation for this position.262 An anal-
ogy can be drawn between this aspect of section 170 and section 74(b).
However, the exclusion of the Nobel Prize or similar award would
present no similar measurement or verification problems.
If the tax code may be used to influence social behavior, the ques-
tion then is whether this particular tax preference had the intended
effect of encouraging humanitarian or public-oriented endeavor.26 3
Without the benefit of statistically verified social science studies on
this point, this writer is not in a position to draw any empirically
defensible conclusions. There are, however, good reasons to doubt
that the tax exclusion directly induced extraordinary conduct on the
part of any fledgling author, scientist, scholar, or humanitarian whose
achievements might have been recognized later with a valuable prize
or award. The small likelihood of ever winning such a prize and the
temporal delay between performing the meritorious behavior and
receiving recognition lead to conjecture that the actual effect of the
section 74(b) exclusion was remote and indirect at best. One other
important factor tending to make the incentive effect of the exclusion
remote was the requirement of section 74(b)(1) that the recipient be
selected without any action on his part to enter the contest or the
selection proceeding. Economists would characterize the behavioral
response of these individuals to the tax benefit as being relatively
inelastic.2
It is, of course, possible that members of Congress decided to dis-
card the section 74(b) exclusion because they believed it to be ineffec-
261. See Bennett, Treatment of Volunteer Services and Related Expenses Under the Internal
Revenue Code, in 4 RESEARCH PAPERS SPONSORED BY THE COMMISSION ON PRIVATE
PHILANTHROPY AND PUBLIC NEEDS 2287, 2289 (1977).
262. See Alvin, Charitable Contributions: "Fruit" and "Tree," 118 J. AcCT. 38, 39 (1964).
263. Judge Posner suggests that the section 74(b) exclusion may have caused individuals to
substitute the described activities (religious, charitable, scientific, etc.) for others. As he put it,
"[t]he existence of these prizes affects research decisions by people in eligible occupations and
even the choice of occupations." R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 464 (3d ed.
1986).
264. The term "elasticity" as used in economics means the proportionate change in one
variable caused by changes in another variable. Here we are interested in the elasticity of the
number of people choosing to engage in publicly-oriented behavior with respect to the tax status
of prizes given for such activity. If response to changes in the tax status was highly elastic, now,
following the virtual elimination of the section 74(b) exclusion, we should observe many
individuals leaving the fields of religion, charity, education, science, the arts, literature and civic
affairs. Since that is not likely to occur, we may conclude that response to changes in the tax
status of such prizes and awards is relatively inelastic.
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tive. In this regard, it should be noted that the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit more than forty years ago in the
"Ross Essay" opinion characterized the use of the tax exclusion to
encourage scholarly work as "wise" and "settled. '2 65 The Congress in
the 1954 Code specifically ratified that policy by writing section 74(b)
into the statute.266 One would think that Congress, after thirty years'
observation, would announce that it eliminated the provision for inef-
fectiveness, if that were the true reason.
Even assuming that the exclusion previously available for qualifying
awards lacked operative economic efficacy,267 consideration must be
given to the question of whether the exclusion should have been
retained for its indirect or symbolic value. In order to answer this
question in any meaningful fashion, it is necessary to address the
larger question of whether statutory pronouncements which seek to
inspire beneficial conduct, but which do not oblige its performance,
are valid or are even laws.268 Exhaustive discussion of the essential
nature of law and the relationship between law and morality is beyond
the scope of this article. 269 Nonetheless, it may be worthwhile briefly
265. McDermott v. Commissioner, 150 F.2d 585, 588 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
266. See supra text accompanying notes 73-84.
267. The assumption that the prior exclusion for prizes like the Nobel Prize did not affect
individual behavior is inconsistent with the tax expenditure criticism of old section 74(b). The
tax expenditure concept is premised on the notion that tax preferences do cause a substitution of
the favored activity for other activity. Professors Surrey and McDaniel offer a technical
explanation of this effect as follows:
The tax expenditure concept posits that an income tax is composed of two distinct
elements. The first element consists of structural provisions necessary to implement a
normal income tax, such as the definition of net income, the specification of accounting
rules, the determination of the entities subject to tax, the determination of the rate schedule
and exemption levels, and the application of the tax to international transactions. These
provisions compose the revenue-raising aspects of the tax. The second element consists of
the special preferences found in every income tax. These provisions, often called tax
incentives or tax subsidies, are departures from the normal tax structure and are designed to
favor a particular industry, activity, or class of persons.
S. SURREY & P. MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES 3 (1985).
268. Law is often defined simply as a command backed up by the coercive power of the state.
This theory of law is usually referred to as legal positivism because it takes law as something
posited by the state and enforced through sanctions imposed by such sovereign authority. While
Thomas Hobbes and Jeremy Bentham made earlier contributions to this view of law, it was John
Austin (1790-1859) who is usually identified with the development of legal positivism through a
series of lectures on jurisprudence which he delivered at London University commencing in
1832. More recently, the noted British philosopher H.L.A. Hart has been regarded as a principal
spokesman for the positivist view of the law. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 18-25
(1961).
269. For comprehensive works on the relationship between law and morality, see R.
DWORKIN, supra note 251; J. FISHKIN, BEYOND SUBJECTIVE MORALITY (1984); L. FULLER,
supra note 252; H.L.A. HART, supra note 268; D. LYONS, ETHICS AND THE RULE OF LAW
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to discuss the influence of moral ideals on the development of the law
and the legitimacy of rewards for exemplary behavior.
Nearly all legal philosophers, from Aristotle27° to Ronald Dwor-
kin,2 7 have recognized some connection between accepted social
morality and the authority of law.272 In both fields we consider mat-
ters of obligation, duty, and rights.273 The law concerns rights and
responsibilities, duties and obligations, and fairness and justice. It
claims authority to lay down rules and to enforce them.274 Morality
on the other hand concerns the making of individual and collective
value judgments about human conduct and distinguishing between
what is right and wrong.275
In The Morality of Law, Professor Lon L. Fuller discerns the exist-
ence of two primary moralities: The morality of duty and the morality
of aspiration.276 The morality of duty lays down basic rules without
which an ordered society is impossible. Violation of those rules will
result in the imposition of some sanction or penalty which serves to
evidence society's disapprobation. An individual whose behavior has
conformed to the minimum conditions of social living is left alone
since that is all that can be required of him in a duty oriented
approach.277 In contrast, Fuller's conception of the morality of aspi-
(1984); J. RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); D. RICHARDS, THE MORAL CRITICISM OF
LAW (1977).
270. In Book V of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle examines in depth the notion of justice
as entailing both lawfulness and virtue.
271. Professor Dworkin in his recent work, Law's Empire, highlights the relationship between
law and morality through the use of the phrase "law as integrity." The law as integrity concept,
in Dworkin's view, "supposes that law's constraints benefit society not just by providing
predictability or procedural fairness, or in some other instrumental way, but by securing a kind
of equality among citizens that makes their community more genuine and improves its moral
justification for exercising the political power it does." R. DWORKIN, supra note 251, at 95-96.
272. The legal positivists generally contend that there is no necessary connection between law
and morality. In their view, an unjust law is still law if commanded by a sovereign having the
capacity to enforce it. See H.L.A. HART, supra note 268, at 151-76. However, the influence of
morality on law is acknowledged: "The law of every modem state shows at a thousand points
the influence of both the accepted social morality and wider moral ideals. These influences enter
into law either abruptly and avowedly through legislation, or silently and piecemeal through the
judicial process." Id. at 199.
273. Id. at 7.
274. Id. at 20-25.
275. See generally J. FISHKIN, THE LIMITS OF OBLIGATION 10-13 (1982); A. SIMMONS,
MORAL PRINCIPLES AND POLITICAL OBLIGATIONS 11 (1979).
276. L. FULLER, supra note 252, at 3-32.
277. Id. at 5-6. Fuller's conception of the "morality of duty" appears similar to Hart's
notion of "moral obligations," although the two differ as to the extent that law must necessarily
conform to morality. Hart discusses moral obligations as follows:
Characteristically, moral obligations and duty, like many legal rules, concern what is to be
done or not to be done in circumstances constantly recurring in the life of the group, rather
Washington Law Review Vol. 63:257, 1988
ration is hortatory rather than obligatory. It seeks to bring out the
fullest realization of human potential. The morality of aspiration
utilizes reward and praise to recognize the attainment of excellence
toward which all mankind should strive.278
The form of reward for meritorious behavior may vary. It may be
tangible or intangible. Tangible rewards would include money prizes
and other awards having substantial economic value. Intangible
rewards would include the public acclaim emanating from having
one's achievements recognized. However, rewards can also be distin-
guished in another way. They may be either external or internal.
External rewards are endowed by others upon the recipient, and may
be tangible or intangible. Internal rewards arise from the satisfaction
which an individual derives for himself from the accomplishment.
The nineteenth century German philosopher Rudolf von Ihering
described these internal rewards as "that satisfaction which a work
itself affords; such is the delight in intellectual work per se, the charm
of proving one's power, the joy of discovery, the pleasure in creating,
the consciousness of having done a service to the world, of having
utilized one's faculties for the welfare of humanity. '279
than in rare or intermittent activities on deliberately selected occasions. What such rules
require are either forbearances, or actions which are simple in the sense that no special skill
or intellect is required for their performance. Moral obligations, like most legal obligations,
are within the capacity of any normal adult. Compliance with these moral rules, as with
legal rules, is taken as a matter of course, so that while breach attracts serious censure,
conformity to moral obligation, again, like obedience to the law, is not a matter for praise
except when marked by exceptional conscientiousness, endurance, or resistance to special
temptation.... If conformity with these most elementary rules were not thought a matter
of course among any group of individuals, living in close proximity to each other, we should
be doubtful of the description of the group as a society, and certain that it could not endure
for long.
H.L.A. HART, supra note 268, at 166-67.
278. There remains for brief mention one final manifestation of the distinction between the
morality of duty and that of aspiration. I refer to the way in which that distinction finds
tacit recognition in our social practices concerning penalties and rewards.
In the morality of duty it is understandable that penalties should take precedence over
rewards. We do not praise a man, or confer honors on him, because he has conformed to
the minimum conditions of social living. Instead we leave him unmolested and concentrate
our attention on the man who has failed in that conformity, visiting on him our disapproval,
if not some more tangible unpleasantness. Considerations of symmetry would suggest that in
the morality of aspiration, which strives toward the superlative, reward and praise should
play the role that punishment and disapproval do in the morality of duty.
L. FULLER, supra note 252, at 30; see also H.L.A. HART, supra note 268, at 176-80 (similar
conception of "moral ideals").
279. See R. VON IHERING, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END, pt. I, ch. VII, § 7, at 143 (I. Husik
trans. 1914); see also W. Evan, Law as an Instrument of Social Change in THE SOCiOLOGY OF
LAW: A SOCIAL-STRUCTURED PERSPECTIVE 554-62 (W. Evan ed. 1980) (discussion of the role
of positive sanctions in the law).
Taxation of Prizes and Awards
While von Ihering valued nonmaterial rewards far more than mate-
rial or monetary ones, in our discussion of tax policy and section 74(b)
we must concentrate on the material reward which an exclusion from
gross income confers. Is it appropriate to reduce the tax burden of a
money prize recipient, thereby increasing the tax burden of all other
taxpayers, simply because he happened to have received the award in
recognition of a significant public achievement? Since so few individu-
als could be eligible for this preference, this is essentially a political or
moral question rather than an economic one.
The tax laws make political statements on all manner of social and
public welfare matters. For example, the exclusion from an
employee's gross income for the value of employer provided health280
and life insurance281 represents a paternalistic political decision to
.encourage employers to provide those forms of benefits rather than
higher levels of monetary compensation. In purely economic terms,
the employer should not prefer one form of compensation over the
other. Congress, however, sought to prevent or at least minimize the
personal or family hardship that would arise in the event of illness or
death.
F Tax Laws as Symbols of National Values
Even if it was only symbolic, was the salutary effect of the exclusion
previously available under section 74(b) sufficient justification for its
retention? If we accept the assertion that law is properly influenced by
the moral ideals282 and the view that law is to perform a constructive
function,283 then the answer is clearly in the affirmative. Congress can
280. I.R.C. § 106(a) (1987) presently provides: "(a) In general.-Gross income does not
include contributions by the employer to accident or health plans for compensation (through
insurance or otherwise) to his employees for personal injuries or sickness." TRA86 added a new
section 89 to the Code setting forth a variety of nondiscrimination rules that will apply to almost
all employee benefit plans including accident or health plans. The rules will become effective no
later than December 31, 1988. At that time, section 106(a) is to be amended to read: "[g]ross
income of an employee does not include employer-provided coverage under an accident or health
plan." See TRA86, supra note 3, § 1151(J)(2), (K).
281. I.R.C. § 79(a) (1987) allows an employee to exclude from gross income the cost paid by
his employer for up to $50,000 of group term life insurance on the employee's life. Key
employees of the employer may only use this exclusion if the plan under which the insurance
coverage is provided meets the present nondiscrimination requirements of I.R.C. § 79(d) (1987)
and, ultimately, the nondiscrimination requirements of I.R.C. § 89 (1987). See TRA86, supra
note 3, § 1151(c)(1), (k).
282. See supra text accompanying notes 270-79.
283. In the closing paragraph of Law's Empire, Professor Dworkin summarizes the
constructive nature of his "law as integrity" concept:
Law's attitude is constructive: it aims, in the interpretative spirit, to lay principle over
practice to show the best route to a better future, keeping the right faith with the past. It is,
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and should use the tax laws to make a statement about the kind of
society we should become, not just to prescribe minimum standards of
economic conduct.
Any utopian construct of an ideal society would include incentives
for individuals to expend effort in pursuit of objectives that would ben-
efit society as a whole. For more than seventy years our tax laws con-
tained such an incentive in the exclusion from gross income of prizes
and awards for significant public achievement. Even if the effect of
that incentive was more symbolic then real, it reflected American pol-
icy that valued cultural and humanitarian achievement at least as
much as economic productivity.
For most of this century, the United States was viewed generally as
the world's preeminent society-both economically and morally. The
recent decline in our economic position justified revisions to the tax
code to improve our productivity and competitiveness in world mar-
kets. However, it was not necessary for us to sacrifice our moral lead-
ership in order to regain the economic high ground. Section 74(b) as it
existed before the Tax Reform Act of 1986 spoke rather eloquently to
Americans and to the international community about our values and
moral aspirations. As a nation, we acknowledged the achievements of
our award winning scientists, educators, artists, and humanitarians by
bestowing upon them the added reward of a tax benefit. Congress
took a giant step backward by destroying the section 74(b) exclusion.
IV. AN ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL
The reasons advanced by the executive and legislative branches
explaining the change made to section 74(b) do not justify its emascu-
lation. The underlying purposes which led Congress in 1954 to add
this exclusion to the Code are no less viable today than then. This is
not to say that Congress did not have a legitimate concern about cir-
cumstances like Jones and the possibility of disguised compensation in
the form of employer to employee awards. However, that concern
could have been answered by denying the exclusion to any award from
an employer to an employee. It was not necessary for Congress to
adopt the requirement that the prize be transferred to charity in order
to solve the Jones problem. If Congress was seeking to encourage the
assignment of valuable prizes to charity, then it should have extended
finally, a fraternal attitude, an expression of how we are united in community though
divided in project, interest, and conviction. That is, anyway, what law is for us: for the
people we want to be and the community we aim to have.
R. DWORKIN, supra note 251, at 413.
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the exclusion for any prize so assigned regardless of the nature of the
award.
The Jones problem centers on the uncertainty created in Regulation
section 1.74-1 which denied the exclusion only to those awards "from
an employer to an employee in recognition of some achievement in con-
nection with his employment."284 It is, no doubt, possible that an
employer might choose to honor an employee with a valuable prize or
award for some nonemployment related achievement, but it is much
more likely that an award coming from an employer has at least some
significant element of compensation. The problem with the Regula-
tion's test was that it required the IRS and the courts to discern the
subjective intent of the employer in giving the award. That, of course,
was the unsatisfactory state of affairs that existed prior to the enact-
ment of section 74 in 1954.285
The disguised compensation problem raised by the Jones case could
have been addressed by providing that no prize or award from an
employer to an employee could qualify for the exclusion available
under section 74(b). While broad denial of the exclusion for employee
awards would go beyond the test of Regulation section 1.74-1(b), the
subject of dispute in Jones, it is a workable solution to the disguised
compensation problem. In this instance, the resurrection of a "bright-
line" test would be welcome. Had Congress chosen to address only
the problem presented by Jones, rather than adopt the diversion to
charity approach found in the Tax Reform Act of 1986, then it would
have reaffirmed the long standing policy of encouraging humanitarian
or public achievement.
If an award recipient or prize winner refuses the prize or award
before it is used or enjoyed, then it is not taxed to the winner regard-
less of the nature of the prize.286 Whether door prize or Pulitzer Prize,
if you turn it down flat, then you have not realized income. What if
instead of refusing the prize, an individual requests that the prize be
given to a particular charity? Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1986,
the Code did not directly address that situation. If the prize involved
was of the section 74(a) variety (door prize, gameshow prize, lottery or
sweepstakes, and so on), then the assignment to charity would not
have prevented the winner from being taxed on the value of the
prize.287 There would, however, have been allowed an offsetting
284. See Treas. Reg. § 1.74-1 (1955) (emphasis added); see also supra note 83.
285. See supra text accompanying notes 30-72.
286. Rev. Rul. 57-374, 1957-2 C.B. 69.
287. Rev. Rul. 58-235, 1958-2 C.B. 26 (the executive director of a tax-exempt charitable
organization was held taxable on the amount of money which he won on a television game show
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deduction under section 170 for the charitable contribution subject to
the percentage limitatons of section 170(b).288
In the case of a charitable gift of a section 74(b) prize prior to the
Tax Reform Act of 1986, the winner was entitled to the exclusion and
probably was also entitled to the section 170 deduction for the contri-
bution. Certainly, that would have been the outcome if the excludable
prize was first accepted and subsequently contributed to charity. The
legislative history suggests that henceforth if a winner of a prize for
notable achievement assigns that prize to charity, only the exclusion
will be available and not also the contribution deduction.289
In the legislative history to the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the
House29° and Senate291 recognized the possibility that the winners of
formerly excludable prizes might still wish to assign the award to
charity and, so as not to discourage them from doing so, continued the
exclusion for public achievement prizes diverted to charity. Presuma-
bly, Congress was willing to extend the exclusion for such transferred
prizes because the winner was willing to forego personal use or con-
sumption of the prize. If the winner is willing to forego personal use
or consumption so that a charity might be benefitted, what difference
does it make whether the prize or award was given for meritorious
past achievement or for correctly guessing the hidden phrase on
"Wheel of Fortune"?
The circumstances surrounding the winning of the award should
not be taken into account so long as the winner transfers the prize to
charity before using or enjoying it. When the winner is willing to
forego the personal benefit and have the prize transferred directly to
charity, then the exclusion should be available regardless of what type
of prize is involved. Use of the exclusion for prizes diverted to charity
would preclude the claiming of a contribution deduction under section
170. However, that result would probably be preferred since the sec-
tion 170 deduction is limited under most circumstances to fifty percent
notwithstanding the fact that he arranged to have the money paid by the producers of the show
directly to the charity).
288. I.R.C. § 170(b) (1987) generally limits the amount an individual may deduct as a
charitable contribution to 50% of adjusted gross income for the year. Under certain
circumstances, the percentage limitation can be as low as 30% or even 20% of adjusted gross
income. Carryovers of excess contributions are provided for in I.R.C. § 170(d). See also Sykes v.
Commissioner, 24 T.C. 1156 (1955) (an individual who had won an automobile as a door prize
which he then donated to the YWCA was required to include the fair market value of the car in
gross income and claim an offsetting deduction as a charitable contribution).
289. See supra text accompanying note 217.
290. See supra text accompanying notes 216-17.
291. Id.
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of adjusted gross income and, after the Tax Reform Act of 1986, can
only be claimed as an itemized deduction.2 92
If the suggestion to expand the exclusion for any prize or award
diverted to charity and the earlier proposal regarding employer
awards to employees were to be favorably considered by Congress,
then section 74(b) would read as follows:
(b) Exception for Certain Prizes and Awards.-
(1) Notable achievement prizes and awards.-Gross income does
not include amounts received as prizes and awards made primarily in
recognition of religious, charitable, scientific, educational artistic, liter-
ary or civic achievement, but only if-
(A) the recipient was selected without any action on his part to
enter the contest or proceeding;
(B) the recipient is not required to render substantial future services
as a condition to receiving the prize or award; and
(C) the prize or award is not from an employer to an employee.
(2) Prizes and awards transferred to charity-Gross income does
not include amounts received as prizes and awards if the prize or award
is transferred by the payor to a governmental unit or organization
described in paragraph (1) or (2) of section 170(c) pursuant to a designa-
tion made by the recipient.
V. CONCLUSION
Following the Jones case in 1984 which was perceived as opening up
the possibility that employers might make widespread attempts to dis-
guise employee compensation as notable achievement awards excluda-
ble from gross income, it was inevitable that Congress would consider
revision of Code section 74(b). In the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Con-
gress added an additional requirement to that section so that hence-
forth awards for significant public achievement such as the Nobel
Prize will be excludable from gross income only if the recipient assigns
the prize to charity prior to using or enjoying it. While this change is
consistent with the general base broadening efforts of the Act, it is
submitted that the reasons offered by Congress do not justify the emas-
culation of a seventy-year-old policy favoring the use of tax incentives
to encourage humanitarian or public achievement in the fields of reli-
gion, charity, science, education, art, literature, and civic affairs.
While some may argue that the tax laws should only be used to
promote economic goals such as making our nation more productive
and competitive in the global marketplace, it is not uncommon for
292. See I.R.C. § 67(b)(4) (1987).
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provisions to be added to or retained in the Internal Revenue Code for
the purposes of promoting social or political objectives. The exclusion
from gross income which used to be available under section 74(b) for
significant public achievement prizes and awards made an important
symbolic statement about the value Americans placed on culture,
altruism, spirituality, and scientific progress. It was not necessary for
Congress to destroy the exclusion in order to prevent the abuses which
were perceived to arise in the wake of the Jones decision. Therefore,
the author urges Congress to consider reinstating the exclusion for
notable achievement prizes except in the employer-employee setting.
So as not to discourage prize and award winners from supporting their
chosen charities, the author also proposes amendatory language that
would exclude from gross income the value of all prizes or awards
assigned to charity.
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